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I. INTRODUCTION
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, a plurality of the Supreme Court
held that only inadvertently discovered evidence could be legally
seized under the plain view doctrine.' The text of the Fourth
Amdendment, the plurality reasoned, mandated this requirement of
inadvertant discovery. 2 Under the Fourth Amendment, warrants
must particularly describe the items to be seized, and police may not
circumvent this scope requirement by intentionally omitting objects
1. 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971) (plurality opinion) ("The second limitation is that the
discovery of evidence in plain view must be inadvertent.").
2. Id. at 471 ("If the initial intrusion is bottomed upon a warrant that fails to mention a
particular object, though the police know its location and intend to seize it, then there is a
violation of the express constitutional requirement of 'Warrants ... particularly describing...
[the] things to be seized.'" (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV)).
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from their search warrant request and then pretextually relying on the
plain view doctrine to justify their actions.' However, despite the plu-
rality's reliance on the express language of the Constitution, the newly
created inadvertence requirement proved controversial.4 Initially,
criticism focused on the Court's failure to define inadvertence.5 Over
the next twenty years, several courts rejected Coolidge's formulation
of plain view seizure, noting that inadvertent discovery had been
required by only a plurality of the Court.6
The Court resolved this controversy in Horton v. California when
it eliminated, rather than clarified, inadvertent discovery requirement
for plain view seizure.7 Horton and an accomplice were suspected of
having used a machine gun and a "stun gun ' 8 to steal jewelry and
cash.9 Although the investigating officer's affidavit referred to both
the weapons and proceeds from the robbery, the search warrant for
Horton's home permitted the officers to search only for the stolen
property. 10 The warrant did not include permission to search for the
weapons. I When the police executed the warrant, they failed to find
any stolen property in Horton's residence, 2 although they did dis-
3. Id.
4. Id. at 517 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White vigorously argued that "the
inadvertence rule is unnecessary to further any Fourth Amendment ends and will accomplish
nothing." Id.
5. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1970 Term-Forward: Even When a Nation Is
at War, 85 HARV. L. REv. 30, 244 (1971) ("The most serious problem with the plurality's
approach to plain view is that Justice Stewart nowhere defined the degree of expectation
required to make a discovery by the police inadvertent.").
6. Eg., North v. Superior Court, 502 P.2d 1305, 1308-09 (Cal. 1972) ("[T]he 'plain view'
issue raised by the plurality opinion was in fact considered by an equally divided court, and
hence was not actually decided in Coolidge.... The judgment of an equally divided United
States Supreme Court is 'without binding force as precedent.' "); State v. Pontier, 518 P.2d
969, 974 (Idaho 1974) ("Justice Stewart's opinion which proposed the adoption of the
inadvertent requirement was signed by only four members of the Court . . . Since the
inadvertent requirement was not espoused by a majority of the Court, it is not binding upon
this court as precedent."); State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 718 n.3 (Utah 1983) ("A fourth
requirement discussed in the opinions in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, that 'the discovery of
evidence in plain view must be inadvertent,' is omitted here since it was specified by only a
plurality of the justices in that case ....
7. 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2305 (1990).
8. Id. at 2304. A "stun gun" is an "electrical shocking device" that the perpetrators used
to subdue their victim. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. Although the Court did not specify the cause of the omission of the weapons from
the search warrant, it commented that when the officer discovered the weapons during the
search for the proceeds, he had probable cause to believe that the weapons were the ones used
in the robbery. Id. at 2310. This suggests that the police had probable cause to search for the
weapons at the inception of the search, and that they were unintentionally omitted from the
search warrant through the magistrate's oversight.
11. Id. at 2304.
12. Id.
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cover the weapons in plain view and immediately seized them. 3 In
Horton's motion to suppress the weapons, he argued that since the
police had anticipated finding the weapons in his home, they had not
found them inadvertently and, therefore, could not seize them under
the plain view doctrine.' 4 Indeed, the investigating officer testified
that while searching for the proceeds from the robbery, as authorized
by the warrant, he also desired to uncover other incriminating evi-
dence.' 5 Nevertheless, because California had rejected inadvertence
as a requirement for a plain view seizure,' 6 both the trial and appellate
courts ruled that the seized weapons were admissible.17 On certiorari,
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, conceded that the weapons
had not been found inadvertently,"8 but concluded that the "seizure
was authorized by the 'plain view' doctrine. '" ' He reasoned that as
long as a police officer confines his search to its appropriate scope, the
inadvertence requirement is unnecessary to protect citizens' privacy
rights.20
Consequently, the Horton Court dispelled the uncertainty sur-
rounding the inadvertence requirement by abrogating the requirement
itself.2' Confined to its narrow facts, Horton appears innocuous. The
13. Id. at 2304-05.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2305.
16. See North v. Superior Court, 502 P.2d 1305 (Cal. 1972).
17. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2305. In unpublished opinions, the California Court of Appeal
for the Sixth District affirmed Horton's conviction, and the California Supreme Court denied
review. Joint Appendix at 43, Horton (No. 88-7164).
18. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2305.
19. Id. at 2311.
20. Id. at 2309-10. Stewart's argument can be illustrated by applying his reasoning to the
facts of Horton. Although the warrant in Horton only authorized police to search for stolen
property, the policeman's affidavit indicated that the police had also expected to find the
weapons used by Horton and his accomplice at Horton's home. Id. at 2304. Regardless of the
policeman's suspicions about the location of the weapons, the police were required to confine
their search to places where the stolen property could conceivably have been stored-the scope
sanctioned by the warrant. Thus, their discovery of the weapons, even though it was not
inadvertent, did not involve an unauthorized invasion of Horton's privacy; the inadvertent
discovery requirement did not decrease the number of places where an officer could legally
look. Id. at 2310 (reiterating White's dissent in Coolidge). As a corollary, Stewart concluded
that the scope requirement adequately protected privacy interests when evidence seized in
plain view was not inadvertently discovered: "If the scope of the search exceeds that permitted
by the terms of a validly issued warrant or the character of the relevant exception from the
warrant requirement, the subsequent seizure is unconstitutional without more." Id. As long
as the police officer had restricted his search to its appropriate scope, it was unnecessary to
investigate his expectations about the evidence seized in plain view.
21. Id. at 2309 ("The fact that an officer is interested in an item of evidence and fully
expects to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its seizure if the search is
confined in area and duration by the terms of the warrant or a valid exception to the warrant
requirement.").
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weapons and proceeds both tied Horton to one robbery-a single
criminal act. Furthermore, the police included both the weapons and
stolen property in their affidavit, and may have been able to establish
probable cause to search for both items.22 Therefore, the exclusion of
the weapons from the warrant apparently resulted from an oversight
on the part of the issuing magistrate.
However, Horton's true impact on searches and seizures, and the
warrant requirement in particular, cannot be analyzed in a superficial,
fact-limited fashion. After Horton, police will be tempted to obtain
warrants authorizing searches for small, easily hidden items so that
the scope requirement will pose no impediment to their search for
other, larger items-items that they believe with a degree of certainty
less than probable cause are in the suspect's residence.23 The danger
posed by this type of police discretion becomes particularly acute
when police deliberately exploit a warrant to search for evidence of
unrelated criminal activity in the calculated hope of making a plain-
view seizure.24
Of course, if police intentionally manipulate a warrant to search
for items that it does not include, then the officers are conducting an
unlawful, pretextual search.25 Because courts always investigate
whether a search was pretextual, the dissent in Horton recognized
that elimination of inadvertent discovery as a requirement for plain-
view seizure might have a "limited impact."' 26 Implicit in the dissent's
reasoning, however, is the assumption that courts are capable of
detecting pretextual searches. This Comment argues that the court's
ability to detect pretextual searches has been impaired by the interac-
tion between two main factors: (1) the contemporary focus on objec-
tive facts as the sole indicia of pretext, 27 and (2) modem police policy,
22. Id. at 2310 (The investigating officer in Horton "had probable cause, not only to obtain
a warrant to search for stolen property, but also to believe that the weapons and handguns had
been used in the crime he was investigating.").
23. Id. at 2313 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24. See People v. Albritton, 187 Cal. Rptr. 652, 653 (Ct. App. 1982) (officer assigned to
auto theft detail used warrant to search for narcotics and unlawfully seize stolen vehicles in
plain view); Lockhart v. State, 305 S.E 2d 22, 23 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (narcotics officer used
warrant to search for "untaxed whiskey" to seize marijuana in plain view).
25. A pretextual search is one in which "the justification proffered by the State for the
search is legally sufficient, but where the searching officer was in fact searching for another,
legally insufficient, reason." John M. Burkhoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It,
Now You Don't, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 523, 523 (1984). For example, if a police officer
exploits a warrant authorizing a search for narcotics to search for stolen property, then the
officer has engaged in a pretextual search. E.g., People v. Albritton, 187 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Ct.
App. 1982). Such searches are an affront to the Fourth Amendment's minimization of police
discretion through the warrant requirement.
26. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2313-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. In a trilogy of recent cases, the Supreme Court has held that pretext can only be
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which has institutionalized interdivisiona 28 and interdepartmental2 9
cooperation between law enforcement officers who are investigating
the unrelated criminal activities of a single suspect.3"
proven by objective facts. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 472 (1985); United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983); Scott v. United States, 438 U.S. 128, 136 (1978).
These objective facts must constitute "extrinsic, non-testimonial evidence of pretext"; an
officer's subjective testimony regarding his motivation for conducting the search is irrelevant to
whether the search was pretextual. Burkhoff, supra note 25, at 524. One example of a
relevant, objective indicator of pretext is the presence of state narcotics officers during an
administrative search of a vessel for proper documentation. See id. at 530-31 (quoting Brief for
Respondents at 9, United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983)(No. 81-1350)).
Because customs officers normally perform documentation checks without the assistance of
other law enforcement officers, the presence of state narcotics officers suggests that the
documentation check was an excuse to search for illicit drugs. Therefore, this kind of
egregious deviation from normal police policy is an example of a germane objective indicator
of pretext. Id. at 528. A police officer's arrest of a murder suspect on an old, outstanding
arrest warrant for failing to appear in court for parking tickets so that he could detain the
suspect and interrogate her about the murder typifies another deviation from normal police
policy. See Ed Aro, Note, "The Pretext Problem Revisited: A Doctrinal Explanation of Bad
Faith in Search and Seizure Cases," 70 B.U. L. REV. 111, 111-16 (1990) (discussing State v.
Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1985), cert. granted, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert. dismissed, 480
U.S. 698 (1987)). Normal police procedure would not authorize an arrest on such a stale
warrant for a minor offense; therefore, the officer's actions would constitute objective proof of
pretext.
28. Interdivisional cooperation refers to collaboration between two different divisions of
the same police department. It occurs, for instance, when officers assigned to the theft division
assist narcotics officers in executing a search warrant for illicit drugs. See, e.g., People v.
Williams, 243 Cal. Rptr. 914, 915 (Ct. App. 1988) (detectives assigned to investigate non-
narcotics related crime aided narcotics officers in serving warrant to search for narcotics);
People v. Albritton, 187 Cal. Rptr. 652, 653 (Ct. App. 1982) (officer assigned to auto theft
detail assisted narcotics officers in search for narcotics).
29. Interdepartmental cooperation occurs when two different law enforcement agencies or
departments assist each other in the execution of a single search warrant. One example is
assistance provided by city narcotics officers to the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms
("ATF") during an authorized search for firearms. See United States v. Medlin, 842 F.2d
1194, 1195 (10th Cir. 1988). When two federal agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement
Agency ("DEA") and the ATF, collaborate to execute a search warrant for firearms,
interdepartmental cooperation also occurs. See, e.g., United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291,
1292 (6th Cir. 1979).
30. Even a sampling of cases involving this type of cooperation between police officers
indicates that the practice is widespread. See, e.g., United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462
U.S. 579, 582 (1983) (state police officers assisted customs agents in on-board ship
documentation investigations); United States v. Medlin, 842 F.2d 1194, 1195 (10th Cir. 1988)
(county deputy sheriff assisted agents in a search for firearms); United States v. Smith, 799
F.2d 704, 705-06 (11 th Cir. 1986) (Florida State Trooper collaborated with the DEA); United
States v. Wright, 667 F.2d 793, 795 (9th Cir. 1982) (state narcotics officers assisted ATF agents
in executing search warrant for a driver's license); United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1292
(6th Cir. 1979) (DEA agents assisted ATF agents in executing warrant for firearms); People v.
Williams, 243 Cal. Rptr. 914, 915 (Ct. App. 1988) (detectives assigned to investigate non-
narcotics related crime aided narcotics officers in serving a warrant to search for narcotics);
People v. Miller, 242 Cal. Rptr. 179, 180 (Ct. App. 1987) (city police officer assisted agents
from Federal Secret Service in search for counterfeit currency); People v. Albritton, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 652, 653 (Ct. App. 1982) (officer assigned to auto theft detail assisted narcotics officers
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has
developed a test aimed at detecting pretextual searches that asks
"whether a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in the
absence of illegitimate motivation."'" When an officer proffers a justi-
fication for an allegedly pretextual search, this objective test evaluates
the genuineness of that justification by measuring the acting officer's
conduct against that of a hypothetical "reasonable" officer, rather
than relying on the officer's own subjective testimony of his motiva-
tion for conducting the search. However, because of the current trend
towards interdivisional and interdepartmental cooperation in the exe-
cution of search warrants, which may soon become standard police
policy, application of the Eleventh Circuit pretextual search test is
difficult and its usefulness limited.32
Consequently, the elimination of the inadvertence requirement
in a search for narcotics); Lockhart v. State, 305 S.E.2d 22 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (narcotics
canine unit assisted county sheriff's department in conducting a search for illicit whiskey);
State v. Harris, 504 So. 2d 156 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (sheriff who had arrested suspect for
reckless driving requested the assistance of a narcotics officer to search the suspect's car for
illegal drugs); State v. Vann, 432 N.W.2d 810, 812-13 (Neb. 1988) (officers assigned to theft
unit assisted narcotics officers in executing a felony arrest warrant for theft).
Furthermore, several cases indicate that assistance between police officers conducting
independent investigations of a single suspect's unrelated criminal activity has become
standard police procedure. See United States v. Medlin, 842 F.2d 1194, 1196-97 (10th Cir.
1988) (ATF agents routinely take along local police officers when executing search warrants);
People v. Williams, 243 Cal. Rptr. 914, 915 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Usually, when additional
manpower was required by the narcotics detail in executing a warrant, normal procedure was
to contact the lieutenant in charge of the detective division, or, if he was unavailable, to go to
one of the sergeants in charge of various details and ask for 'anybody' who might be
available."); People v. Miller, 242 Cal. Rptr. 179, 180 (Ct. App. 1987) (field office of United
States Secret Service had only four agents and "routinely" relied on other agencies for
assistance).
31. E.g., United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (1 1th Cir. 1986). The Eleventh Circuit
test was designed to address the allegations of pretext arising when police officers seize
narcotics during investigative traffic stops. See also United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512,
1517 (10th Cir. 1988) (adopting the Eleventh Circuit test). But see United States v. Cardona-
Rivera, 904 F.2d 1149, 1154 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the Eleventh Circuit test when a
pretextual search for narcotics was alleged during a suspended license stop); United States v.
Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041-42 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the Eleventh Circuit test when
pretextual search for narcotics was alleged during stop for driving with a suspended license);
United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the Eleventh Circuit
test when an officer arrested the defendant on an outstanding petty theft warrant to interrogate
him about a bank robbery). This Comment applies the Eleventh Circuit test to a variety of
plain view seizures, such as seizures of stolen property in a defendant's home under a warrant
to search for narcotics. See infra part VI.
. 32. For instance, because the "reasonable officer" assigned to burglary can always be
called upon to assist narcotics officers in the execution of a narcotics search warrant, it will be
nearly impossible to prove that the burglary officer exploited the narcotics warrant as a pretext
to search for stolen property. Moreover, if the burglary officer's participation in the search
conforms to standard operating procedures, there will be no deviation from police policy,
which normally is a prima facia indicator of pretext. Burkhoff, supra note 25, at 528.
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for plain view seizure in Horton creates an unforeseen, but foreboding
potential for undetectable pretextual searches. In the absence of the
inadvertence requirement, officers may now be able to circumvent the
Fourth Amendment's mandate that warrants "particularly describ[e]
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized""3 by
requesting search warrants for small, easily secluded items in the hope
that they will discover other, larger items that they only suspect are
located in the suspect's residence or business. Freed of the inadver-
tence requirement, police officers investigating a single suspect's
independent crimes can exploit a warrant authorizing the search for
evidence of one crime to search for evidence of an unrelated crime for
which they lack requisite probable cause.3a  Thus, in Horton, the
Court may have unintentionally created a perilous paradox: the war-
rant requirement, whose primary purpose is to minimize police discre-
tion,35 instead becomes a vehicle for enhancing discretion. When the
Horton Court eliminated the inadvertence requirement, it abrogated a
vague but necessary restriction on police discretion-it threw out the
baby with the proverbial bath water.
Part II of this Comment analyzes the contemporary pretextual
search doctrine. It defines pretextual searches and details the three
Supreme Court cases 36 that mandate that alleged pretextual searches
be analyzed exclusively on the basis of objective facts, rather than the
subjective testimony of the investigating officer. Following discussion
of Supreme Court precedent, Part II presents the two tests lower
appellate courts have developed to detect pretextual searches in
response to the Court's focus on objective criteria. Part II also exam-
ines how pretextual searches undermine the protection of privacy
rights, and how the warrant requirement should ideally minimize
police discretion. Part III analyzes Coolidge v. New Hampshire,a7 a
33. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon Oath or affirmation, and particularly discribing the place to
be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
34. As this Comment illustrates, police discretion becomes especially problematical when
the evidence seized in "plain view" is unrelated to the evidence listed in the warrant, such as
when burglary or theft officers seize stolen property in plain view during a search authorized
by a narcotics warrant. See People v. Williams, 243 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Ct. App. 1988); People v.
Albritton, 187 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Ct. App. 1982).
35. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349 (1974).
36. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462
U.S. 579 (1983); Scott v. United States, 438 U.S. 128 (1978).
37. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
1991]
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case that illustrates the role of the inadvertence requirement in limit-
ing police discretion through preservation of the warrant process.
Part IV traces the development of the inadvertence requirement from
Coolidge to its definitive link with police discretion and pretextual
searches in Texas v. Brown.38 Part V analyzes and discusses Horton,
and focuses on the majority's claim that judicial enforcement of the
scope of a search will adequately protect Fourth Amendment rights in
the absence of the inadvertence requirement. Part VI forecasts the
potential impact of eliminating the inadvertence requirement for plain
view seizures: police exploitation of a warrant authorizing a search for
evidence of one crime in order to conduct their own investigation of
unrelated criminal activity. Further, this Part examines the contem-
porary cooperation between law enforcement agencies investigating
unrelated criminal conduct of a single suspect. By comparing three
California cases, Part VI demonstrates that adoption of an objective
test for pretextual searches and institutionalization of police coopera-
tion may frustrate judicial attempts to analyze alledgedly unlawful
police discretion. Ultimately, the goal of this Comment is propose a
new scheme aimed at minimizing the ability of police to use the plain
view doctrine as a pretext for implementing their own discretion at
the expense of the warrant requirement and individual privacy rights.
II. PRETEXTUAL SEARCHES
A pretextual search occurs when the "justification proffered by
the State for the search is legally sufficient, but where the searching
officer was in fact searching for another, legally insufficient, reason." 39
For example, discovery of contraband in plain view during a routine
traffic stop often results in allegations of a pretextual search. 40 Typi-
cally, after an arrest for a narcotics violation, the defendant moves to
suppress the seized drugs, claiming that the traffic stop was merely a
pretext for a general exploratory search for illicit drugs.41
But pretextual searches are not confined to cars on public high-
ways. When stolen property is seized in "plain view" during a search
38. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
39. Burkhoff, supra note 25, at 523.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Cardona-Rivera, 904 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986).
41. See, e.g., Cardona-Rivera, 904 F.2d at 1151-53; Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1038; Guzman, 864
F.2d at 1514-15; Smith, 799 F.2d at 706. In these cases, the defendant contended that
although the justification proffered by the state for the search, the traffic stop, was sufficient,
the officer had intended all along to search for narcotics, a legally insufficient reason in the
absence of probable cause.
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of a defendant's home for narcotics, the defendant occasionally
accuses the police of having used the narcotics warrant as a pretext to
search for the stolen property that the officers had expected to find all
along.42 Thus, illegal pretextual searches and constitutional plain
view seizures are often inextricably intertwined; where both are
alleged, a court must ascertain which one actually occurred.
A. The Focus on Objective Facts as the Sole Indicia of Pretext
In three cases-Scott v. United States,43 United States v. Vii-
lamonte-Marquez,4" and Maryland v. Macon45-the Supreme Court
held that nontestimonial, objective facts46 are the sole criteria for eval-
uating allegations of pretext. Testimonial evidence of the officer's
subjective intent is irrelevant.47 Limiting the pretextual search
inquiry to objective facts harmonizes the test for pretext with other
aspects of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,48 such as
the Terry v. Ohio49 test, which permits limited pat-down searches of
individuals for officer safety purposes.
1. SCOT v. UNITED STATES
In Scott v. United States5°-a case that did not involve allegations
of a pretextual search-the Supreme Court first employed Terry's
objective framework in holding that an officer's subjective intent was
irrelevant to a judicial review of his behavior during a search." In
42. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 243 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Ct. App. 1988); People v. Albritton,
187 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Ct. App. 1982).
43. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
44. 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
45. 472 U.S. 465 (1985).
46. See Burkhoff, supra note 25, at 524-25.
47. Macon, 472 U.S. at 470-71; Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 584 n.3; Scott, 436 U.S.
at 136-37.
48. See Aro, supra note 27, at 127-35.
49. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). In Terry, the court held that an officer could conduct a "stop
and frisk" when he reasonably concluded that a suspect was armed and dangerous and about
to commit a crime. Id. The officer, however, has to justify his conduct by identifying the
"specific, articulable" facts which serve as the basis for his conclusion. Id. at 21. The Court
explained that objective standards were crucial to evaluation of all searches and seizures:
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is
assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws
can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must
evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or in light of the particular
circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be
judged against an objective standard ....
Id. (footnote omitted).
50. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
51. Id. at 137-38. Searches that are challenged on constitutional grounds should be
examined by using a "standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying
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Scott, federal agents wiretapped a narcotics suspect's telephone, ignor-
ing a judicial order that limited the types of calls they could inter-
cept.52 The government officers intentionally listened to all calls
made on the tapped line, except wrong numbers.- 3  Despite the
agents' apparently egregious disregard for the limits imposed by the
order, the Supreme Court held that the agents had conducted a con-
stitutional search and seizure.54  The Court discounted the officers'
intentional violation of the order, commenting that evaluation of
alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment depends solely upon an
"objective assessment of an officer's actions in light of the facts and
circumstances then known to him."' 55  For the Court, the officer's
state of mind or subjective intent during the search is not relevant
when a judge reviews the officer's conduct.56 As a result, the Court
concluded that the agents had acted reasonably in "seizing" all the
calls because, as a practical matter, they had to listen to a call in its
intent or motivation of the officers involved." Id. at 138. In Scott, the Court justified the
exclusive role of objective factors in an evaluation of pretext by noting that the Fourth
Amendment prohibited "unreasonable searches," and Terry had emphasized the objective
aspect of the term "reasonable." Id. at 137. Without further elaboration, this justification is
unenlightening and unpersuasive. One federal appellate court reasoned that "an examination
of a police officer's subjective intent in individual cases would unwisely involve the court in
unproductive inquiries" because officers would "adopt the proper purpose as the basis for their
action." United States v. Guzman, 864 F. 2d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
However, when an officer is questioned under oath, he or she may divulge the pretextual
nature of his search in open testimony. See, e.g., id. at 1514 (officer admitted under oath that
he stopped the defendant's car to investigate whether he was transporting contraband, not for
a seat belt violation); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1180 (5th Cir. 1987) (officer
testified that the only reason he arrested the defendant on an outstanding petty theft warrant
was so that he could interrogate him about a bank robbery); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d
704, 706 (11 th Cir. 1986) (officer testified that he stopped the defendants' car to search it for
contraband, not because it "weaved"). Thus, questioning an officer about his subjective intent
may very well be revealing.
52. Scott, 436 U.S. at 132.
53. Id. at 133 n.7 (The agent in charge of the investigation testified that the "only effective
steps taken by us to curtail the reception of conversations was in that instance where the line
was connected to-misconnected from the correct line and connected to an improper line.").
54. Id. at 142-43.
55. Id. at 137. The court based its conclusion on the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
unreasonable searches and on Terry's emphasis of "the objective aspect of the term
'reasonable.' " Id.
56. Id. at 136. The Court agreed with the government's position that "subjective intent
alone ... does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional." Id. (footnote
omitted). The Court noted that in past cases it had "held that the fact the officer does not have
the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for
the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justify that action." Id at 138. To illustrate this point, the Court cited United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), where it held that an officer could conduct a search
incident to an arrest even though he did not fear that the suspect was armed. Scott, 436 U.S. at
138. The arrest endowed the officer with objective authority to conduct the search. Therefore,
his state of mind, i.e., subjective intent, was irrelevant. Id. at 138.
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entirety to determine whether it was narcotics related, and therefore
incriminating or innocent."
2. UNITED STATES v VILLAMONTE-MARQUEZ
In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,58 the Court employed its
analytical framework where an alleged pretextual search was directly
at issue. In that case, an agent of the U.S. Customs Service, accompa-
nied by a Louisiana state policeman, boarded the defendant's vessel
under the auspices of the agent's statutory authority to check the
ship's documentation. 9 Once on board, the customs agent smelled
marijuana burning and, after peering through an open hatch,
observed bales of contraband.' The ensuing search uncovered 5,800
pounds of marijuana, which was subsequently seized.6"
At trial, the defendants alleged that the Louisiana State Police
and U.S. Customs agents had used the documentation check as a pre-
text to search for illicit drugs.62 To substantiate their claim, the
defendants noted that the night before the search, an informant had
told customs that a vessel in the ship channel was laden with mari-
juana, prompting customs agents to form a narcotics patrol with the
Louisiana narcotics officers 6 -an action which the defendants
claimed was objective proof of pretext.64 However, citing Scott v.
United States, the Court dismissed this argument.65 It held that the
boarding of the defendants' vessel and the subsequent seizure of mari-
57. Scott, 436 U.S. at 142. Burkhoff notes that "[a] subjective inquiry... was irrelevant to
the decision in Scott because the majority concluded that whatever the searching officers'
subjective intent, lawful or otherwise, they had not acted upon it." Burkhoff, supra note 25, at
528. The agents simply had no "opportunity to minimize" the number of calls they
intercepted because it was impossible for them to determine whether a call was covered by the
warrant until they had listened to the call. Id. at 526. Burkhoff concludes that the Court's
dismissal of the agents' subjective motivations might have been mere dicta. Id. at 528.
58. 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
59. Id. at 583. (" 'Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or




62. Id. at 584 n.3.
63. Id.
64. Burkhoff, supra note 25, at 531 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 9, Villamonte-
Marquez, (No. 81-1350)).
65. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 584 n.3. ("This line of reasoning was rejected in a
similar situation in Scott v. United States ... , and we again reject it."). Burkhoff claims that
the Court misconstrued Scott. Even if Scott held that a police officer's subjective motivation is
irrelevant, the Villamonte-Marquez Court could not use Scott to dismiss the defendants'
objective proof that the search was pretextual: "The Scott decision did not purport to cut off
defendant's right to present, at the bare minimum, 'objective' evidence supporting their
allegations of pretext." Burkhoff, supra note 25, at 530.
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juana was lawful,66 notwithstanding the officers' potentially devious
motivations for conducting the search for narcotics. Thus, in Vil-
lamonte-Marquez, the Court eliminated the officer's state of mind as a
factor in determining whether a search is pretextual, despite the
arguably persuasive, objective evidence of pretext.67
3. MARYLAND ,. MACON
In Maryland v. Macon,68 the Court reiterated that objective facts
are the sole indicia of pretext.69 Posing as a paying customer, a detec-
tive purchased two magazines from Macon using a marked $50 bill.70
After concluding that the magazines were obscene, the detective
returned to the store, retrieved the marked bill, and arrested Macon.71
At trial, the court convicted Macon for distributing obscene material
after the prosecution introduced several seized magazines into evi-
dence.72 On appeal, Macon argued that because the policeman had
intended to retrieve the marked bill when he "purchased" the maga-
zine, he had used the "sale" as a pretext to make a warrantless,
unconstitutional seizure.7a The Court, however, rejected Macon's
position, citing Scott for the proposition that an officer's subjective
motivations are irrelevant to Fourth Amendment issues-only the
objective facts and circumstances surrounding the search are mate-
rial.74 The Court reasoned: "Objectively viewed, the transaction was
a sale in the ordinary course of business. The sale is not retrospec-
tively transformed into a warrantless seizure by virtue of the officer's
subjective intent to retrieve the purchase money to use as evidence. ' 75
66. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 579.
67. Burkhoff criticizes the Court for its summary dismissal of the defendant's objective
evidence. Burkhoff, supra note 24, at 531-32.
What was the Villamonte-Marquez majority's response to these claims of
objective manifestations of pretext? In one sentence, taken again from footnote
three, the Court concluded "this line of reasoning was rejected in a similar
situation in Scott .... and we again reject it." No, a thousand times nol The
Scott decision only involved the issue of the significance of subjective evidence of
pretext, and even then, arguably in dictum.
Id. at 531-32 (footnote omitted).
68. 472 U.S. 463 (1985).
69. Id. at 470-71.
70. Id. at 465.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 466.
73. Id. at 470.
74. "Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred 'turns on an objective
assessment of the officer's actions in light of the circumstances confronting him at the time...
and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken." Id. at
470-71 (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 471.
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B. Federal Appellate Court Tests to Detect Pretextual Searches
In response to the Scotti Villamonte-Marquez/Macon trilogy,
several federal appellate courts developed tests that use objective cri-
teria to distinguish unconstitutional pretextual searches from consti-
tutional plain view seizures. Two dramatically different tests have
emerged as a result.
1. UNITED STATES . SMITH: THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT TEST
The first test, advanced by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit in United States v. Smith,76 asks whether a "reasonable officer
would have made the seizure in the absence of illegitimate motiva-
tion."'7 In Smith, a state trooper was cooperating with the Drug
Enforcement Agency ("DEA") in an operation to intercept drug cou-
riers. 78 The trooper ostensibly stopped Smith for "weaving" after his
car allegedly veered six inches into the emergency lane, though later
the trooper testified that Smith's "overly cautious" driving originally
aroused his suspicions because it matched a drug courier profile.79
After making the stop, the patrolman summoned a DEA agent and a
dog trained in drug detection to the scene. The subsequent search of
Smith's car uncovered a kilogram of cocaine hidden in the trunk. 0
At trial, the trooper admitted that he had stopped Smith's car to con-
duct a search for drugs, not for weaving." Based on this testimony,
the trial court found that the traffic stop was pretextual, as no traffic
violation had occurred.82 Nevertheless, the court denied Smith's
motion to suppress the evidence, holding that the drug courier profile
"provided adequate grounds for the stop. '8 3
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with trial court's deter-
mination that the search was pretextual,84 but rejected the trial court's
reliance on the patrolman's testimonial admission that he had stopped
Smith's car to search for narcotics.8" Relying on Maryland v. Macon
76. 799 F.2d 704 (1 1th Cir. 1986).
77. Id. at 708.
78. Id. at 705.




83. Id. at 707.
84. Id. at 711.
85. "[W]hile Trooper Vogel's courtroom declaration of motive is intriguing, what turns
this case is the overwhelming objective evidence that Vogel had no interest in investigating
drunk driving charges .... " Id. at 710. The court also held that Trooper Vogel's reliance on
the drug courrier profile was unconstitutional because the factors cited by him-the presence
of two young men driving in an out-of-state car at 3:00 a.m. in accordance with traffic
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and Scott v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit created a test to detect
pretextual searches during investigative traffic stops which focused on
an objective evaluation of an officer's conduct and ignored the officer's
underlying, personal motivations. a6 The Eleventh Circuit held that
"in determining whether an investigative stop is invalid as pretextual,
the proper inquiry is whether a reasonable officer would have made
the seizure in the absence of illegitimate motivation." 7 In applying
its newly fashioned test to the facts of Smith, the court dismissed the
officer's testimony that he had stopped Smith's car to search for
drugs, rather than to issue a traffic citation, as irrelevant.8 Instead,
the Eleventh Circuit assessed the officer's actions objectively,89 noting
that the patrolman initially pursued Smith before observing any weav-
ing.9° Indeed, despite Smith's weaving, the officer did not investigate
whether Smith was drunk.9' The court also noted that the officer had
originally characterized Smith's driving as "overly cautious," 92 a
direct contradiction to his later assertion that Smith was driving errat-
ically. 93 On these facts, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a reason-
able officer would not have stopped Smith absent an additional illicit
purpose, such as the desire to search for the suspected nacotics. 94
Thus, after an objective evaluation of this officer's conduct, the Elev-
enth Circuit held the traffic stop pretextual and the subsequent search
unreasonable."
2. UNITED STATES . CA USEY: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT TEST
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied a radically
different interpretation of the same Supreme Court precedents in
United States v. Causey.96 After an anonymous informant told police
that Causey had robbed a bank, the police arrested Causey on an out-
regulations-were "insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of drug activity." Id. at
708 n.5.
86. Id. at 709.
87. Id. at 708. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit adopted this test
in United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988).
88. Smith, 799 F.2d at 710. "In determining the validity of the stop of appellants'
automobile by Trooper Vogel, we . . . are not concerned with Trooper Vogel's subjective
intent." Id. Accordingly, the court found the patrolman's testimony concerning his motive
"intriguing" but not relevant. Id.
89. Id. at 710-11.
90. Id. at 710.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 706.
93. Id. at 711.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987).
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standing warrant issued years earlier for failure to appear in court on
a petty theft charge. 97 While Causey was in custody, the police inter-
rogated him about the bank robbery and obtained a confession. 98 At
trial, Causey moved to suppress his confession on Fourth Amendment
grounds, claiming that his arrest on the warrant for failure to appear
had been pretextual, merely a facade that the police had used to inter-
rogate him about the unrelated bank robbery. 99 At the suppression
hearing, one of the officers testified that their only reason for arresting
Causey on the warrant was "to take him downtown and continue
[the] investigation of the bank robbery."' ° Ignoring the testimony to
the contrary, the trial court held that Causey's arrest was not pretex-
tual and admitted his confession into evidence. 101
Like the Eleventh Circuit in Smith, the Fifth Circuit began its
analysis with the Supreme Court's rule that objective facts alone are
dispositive in evaluating an alleged pretextual search, and thus an
officer's subjective intent is irrelevant. 0 2 However, while the Elev-
enth Circuit analyzed the officers' objective actions in terms of what a
reasonable officer would do, the Fifth Circuit evaluated them from the
standpoint of what a reasonable officer could do. Because the arrest-
ing officers in Causey had legal authority to arrest Causey on the out-
standing warrant, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that their seizure of
Causey had been objectively reasonable. °3 The rule that emerged
from United States v. Causey is that "so long as police do no more
than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their
motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject toinquiry.'' °4
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit gave a substantively different
meaning and role to "objective facts." While the Eleventh Circuit
based its finding of pretext in Smith on the officer's failure to investi-
gate Smith's sobriety after stopping him for weaving, it was of no con-
sequence to the Fifth Circuit that the arresting officers in Causey
never investigated the petty theft charges. The Fifth Circuit never
even considered whether a reasonable officer, whose primary law




101. Id. at 1185.
102. Id. at 1182. "[T]he Supreme Court-in three cases of its own-has made plain that it
is irrelevant what subjective intent moves an officer in taking such an action as this; what
signifies is the officer's actions, objectively viewed in light of the circumstances confronting
him." Id. at 1182; see also id. at 1182-84 (citing Scott, Villamonte-Marquez, and Macon).
103. Id. at 1185.
104. Id. at 1184.
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
enforcment responsibility is to investigate bank robberies, would have
arrested Causey for failing to appear in court on the petty theft
charges absent the informant's tip regarding the bank robbery. The
Eleventh Circuit would have noted that a reasonable officer who
lacked an ulterior motive would not have gone out of his way to arrest
a suspect like Causey on a stale warrant for a minor offense, such as
failure to appear in court to answer to a petty theft charge. Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit would have concluded that the arresting officer's pri-
mary motivation was to interrogate Causey about the bank robbery.
It would have viewed the petty theft warrant as a mere facade for this
illicit, underlying impetus. Once the Eleventh Circuit uncovered the
pretextual character of the officer's conduct, it would have suppressed
Causey's confession.I"
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit test validates an officer's conduct only
if a reasonable officer Would have acted in the same way absent the
alleged illicit motivation. Any justification that an officer proffers for
his conduct is insufficient if a hypothetical reasonable officer under
identical circumstances would have ignored the offense as inconse-
quential. However, the Fifth Circuit test only asks whether the rea-
sonable officer would have had the legal capacity to conduct the
search or seize the evidence at issue. It ratifies police conduct as long
as the officer can provide some legitimate source of authority-no
matter how attenuated or dubious-to support his actions. It does
not evaluate whether the officer used one source of authority as a pre-
text to accomplish an unrelated, unconstitutional objective; so long as
the officer is empowered to stop a defendant's car for minor traffic
violations, it does not matter that he did so only to search the car for
narcotics that he hoped to find in plain view. Indeed, the Fifth Cir-
cuit test renders an investigation of pretext unnecessary. If an officer
conducts a search or seizes evidence when a hypothetical, reasonable
officer would have lacked the authority to do so, then the actual
officer acted illegally regardless of the justification that he offers for
his conduct. Despite the differences in the approach of the two
tests,' 6 there is likely to be little difference in result when police vali-
date their initial intrusion on a suspect's privacy with a search war-
rant and exploit the new trend towards institutionalized law
105. United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11 th Cir. 1986). The Eleventh Circuit rejected
the Fifth Circuit's analytical framework: "We conclude . . . that in determining when an
investigatory stop is unreasonably pretextual, the proper inquiry, again, is not whether the
officer could validly have made the stop but whether under the same circumstances a
reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of the invalid purpose." Id. at 709.
106. See infra part VI.
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enforcement cooperation. 107 Then, even the Eleventh Circuit test will
likely provide inadequate protection from the pretextual use of plain
view seizure.
C. Pretextual Searches and the Fourth Amendment
Pretextual searches imperil Fourth Amendment rights-ideals
which the Supreme Court had historically preserved.108 This Part dis-
cusses the interaction between the warrant requirement, police discre-
tion, pretextual searches, and the inadvertence requirement for plain
view seizure.
In its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
struggled to reconcile two competing concerns: crime control and
privacy rights. 19 While citizens need protection from outlaws, they
also must be shielded from overzealous police officers who are con-
sumed by the "competitive enterprise" of apprehending criminals. 10
To prevent the abuses of unbridled police discretion,1 1 the Court has
traditionally required rigid adherence to the warrant requirement,
absent an exigency.11 2  To preserve privacy rights, the Court has
imposed a "neutral and detached magistrate" between a suspect and
an policeman's ambitious impulses. 13
107. See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
108. Daniel S. Jonas, Comment, Pretext Searches and the Fourth Amendment:
Unconstitutional Abuses of Power, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1791 (1989).
109. E.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.
692, 702-03 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See generally Amsterdam, supra note 35.
110. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-14 (1984); Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204, 212 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 n.24 (1979); Terry, 392 U.S. at
12; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1947); see also Amsterdam, supra note 35, at
414.
111. E.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) ("A central concern ... has been to
assure that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary
invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field."); Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, 394-95 (1978) ("[T]hese so-called guidelines are hardly so rigidly confining as the
state seems to assert. They confer unbridled discretion upon the individual officer .... ");
Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 1635 (1990); Warden v Harden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967).
112. "[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject to only a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967); see also Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390; Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1969); Terry,
392 U.S. at 20; Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735 (1983).
113. E.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 913-14 ("[A] search warrant 'provides the detached scrutiny of
a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the
hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.'" (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)); Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) ("The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth
Amendment is to impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by
government officials, including law enforcement agents" to protect individual privacy.); Terry,
392 U.S. at 21 ("The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is
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A search warrant protects privacy rights and deters abuse of
police discretion in two ways. First, an impartial magistrate's antece-
dent evaluation of probable cause prevents police from initiating
unjustified searches based entirely on their own suspicions." 4 In
addition, the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant "particu-
larly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.""' A magistrate, therefore, also minimizes police discre-
tion in the execution of searches by specifying the scope of the search
in the warrant." 16 Thus, when police officers seize items not particu-
larly described in a warrant, they tip the fragile balance between law
and order and individual privacy rights prescribed by the Fourth
Amendment. "17
assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be
subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances."); see
also Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395-96 (holding that the Arizona Supreme Court's guidelines
authorizing a warrantless search of a scene of a murder investigation were unconstitutionally
vague because they permitted police to circumvent probable cause and scope determinations of
a neutral and detached magistrate); Amsterdam, supra note 35, at 414-17; Aro, supra note 27,
at 118-26.
114. E.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212-16 (1981) ("The purpose of a
warrant is to allow a neutral judicial officer to assess whether the police have probable cause to
make an arrest of conduct a search .... A contrary conclusion-that the police, acting alone
and in the absence of exigent circumstances, may decide when there is sufficient justification
for searching the home of a third party the subject of an arrest warrant-would create a
significant potential for abuse."); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) ("[W]e have
long adhered to the view that the warrant procedure minimizes the danger of needless
intrusions .... ); Katz, 389 U.S. at 356 ("It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with
restraint. . . . [T]he inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents
themselves, not by a judicial officer. They were not required, before commencing the search, to
present their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate."); see
also Amsterdam, supra note 35, at 417 ("A paramount purpose of the Fourth Amendment is
to prohibit arbitrary searches and seizures as well as unjustified searches and seizures.").
115. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
116. Eg., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 325 (1979) (holding an open-ended
warrant invalid because it "left it entirely to the discretion of the officials conducting the
search to decide what items were likely to be obscene and to accomplish their seizure");
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)
("The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes
general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer
executing the warrant."); see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1982); Walter v.
United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 n.7 (1980); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976);
Amsterdam, supra note 35, at 412 ("Under the [F]ourth [A]mendment, even where the initial
justification for a search was determined by a magistrate, executive discretion in its execution
was to be curbed by the requirement of particularity of description in the warrant of the items
subject to seizure.").
117. E.g., Lo-Ji Sales, 442 U.S. at 321-29. In Lo-Ji Sales, police purchased two allegedly
obscene films from the defendant's adult bookstore. Id. at 321. After viewing the two films,
the town justice issued a search warrant for the store, which authorized the seizure of all
copies of the two films and other items that the court "independently [on examination] has
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Similarly, pretextual searches compromise the restrictions on
police discretion provided by the warrant requirement.' 18 If police
may exploit a warrant authorizing the search for one item by search-
ing for another item, they in effect bypass the Fourth Amendment's
probable cause and scope requirements.' 1 9 Relying on only their own
judgment that a search is justified, police officers can initiate an inves-
tigation without a judicial review of their basis for searching for the
item excluded from the search warrant. Thus, through pretextual
searches, police officers determine the justification for and scope of a
search-the role that the Constitution expressly conferred to a neutral
and detached magistrate as a safeguard against police officers' com-
petitive impulses.
III. COOLIDGE V. NEW HAMPSHIRE: THE ORIGIN OF THE
INADVERTENCE REQUIREMENT
Coolidge v. New Hampshire20 was the genesis of the inadvertence
requirement for plain view seizure. 2' Indeed, a comparison of the
different opinions delivered in Coolidge'2 2 graphically illustrates the
policies underlying the inadvertence requirement: deterring the
pretextual use of plain view seizure, and controlling police discretion
determined to be possessed in violation" of the state obscenity law. Id. at 321-22. While
executing the search warrant, the policemen and the town justice seized many films and
magazines that were not particularly specified in the warrant. Id at 322-23. The defendant
moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that it had been seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. His motion was denied, and he pled guilty to second degree obscenity charges.
Id. at 324. On appeal, the Supreme Court observed that "[e]xcept for the specifications of
copies of two films previously purchased, the warrant did not purport to 'particularly describe
... the.., things to be seized.'" Id. at 325 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). The Court
compared the open-ended warrant to a general warrant of the Eighteenth Century, the
primary target of Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Id.
at 325. In reversing the defendant's conviction for obscenity, the Court commented: "Our
society is better able to tolerate the admittedly pornographic business of petitioner than a
return to the general warrant era; violations of law must be dealt with within the framework of
constitutional guarantees." Id. at 329.
118. See Burkhoff, supra note 25, at 534 (noting that pretextual searches "pervert the whole
notion that the [F]ourth [A]mendment is capable of supporting workable restrictions on police
misconduct"); Aro, supra note 27, at 118-26.
119. Aro, supra note 27, at 125-26.
120. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
121. Id. at 469-72.
122. Justice Stewart wrote for the plurality and was joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan,
and Marshall. Id. at 445. Justice Harlan filed a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 490.
Justice Burger dissented in part, and concurred in part. Id. at 492. Justice Black delivered his
own concurring and dissenting opinion, id. at 493, as did Justice White, who was joined by
Chief Justice Warren, id. at 510.
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through the warrant requirement. 123
A. The Facts of Coolidge v. New Hampshire
Coolidge was convicted of murdering a fourteen year-old girl'
24
whose abandoned body was found near a highway.' 25 After the attor-
ney general who headed the murder investigation issued arrest and
search warrants, 26 police officers arrested Coolidge and seized his
car.'12  The car was then towed to the police station where it was
searched on three different occasions over a fifteen-month period. 128
At Coolidge's murder trial, the State introduced incriminating vac-
uum sweepings from the car into evidence. 129 Subsequently, Coolidge
was found guilty of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.
1 30
Writing for the plurality, Justice Stewart began by holding that
the warrant issued by the attorney general was invalid because, as
"the chief investigator and prosecutor" on the case, the attorney gen-
eral had not acted as a neutral or detached magistrate.13 ' Conse-
quently, unless the search fell within one of the exigency exceptions to
the warrant requirement, the vacuum sweepings were inadmissible. 1
32
Before discussing plain view seizure, the plurality held that the search
and seizure were not justifiable as either a search incident to arrest,133
123. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 (1983); Burkhoff, supra note 25 at 546-48; see
also infra part IV.
124. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 448.
125. Id. at 445.
126. Id. at 446- 47. The attorney general later served as chief prosecutor at Coolidge's trial.
Id. at 450.
127. Id. at 447.
128. Id. at 447-48.
129. Id. at 448.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 453.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 455-57. The plurality based its conclusion on the requirement that a search
incident to arrest must occur contemporaneously with the arrest and be restricted to the
immediate vicinity of the arrest. Id. at 456. Coolidge's car was searched well after Coolidge
had been arrested, and Coolidge had been arrested inside his house while his car was located
outside. Id. In his dissent, Justice Black argued that the search and seizure of Coolidge's car
was valid as a search incident to an arrest. Id. at 505-10 (Black, J., dissenting). On the basis of
this precedent, he noted that evidence seized during a search incident to an arrest would
seldom be discovered inadvertently, and concluded that the plurality's holding "abolishe[d]
seizure incident to arrest." Id. at 509. In response to Black, Stewart stressed that judicial
review of a search incident to arrest involved an evaluation of the timing of arrest; it did not
implicate inadvertent discovery. Id. at 471 n.27. Furthermore, the seizure in Coolidge could
not be justified as a search incident to arrest because it involved a "planned warrantless
seizure" of evidence, suggesting that the police had timed Coolidge's arrest so that they could
seize his car-a practice prohibited by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 767 (1969).
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 471 n.27.
Stewart's reliance on Chimel, however, was incorrect. Earlier in his opinion, Stewart
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or under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.'34
Because the police had known the description and location of the car
and had intended to seize it, Coolidge's car had not been discovered
inadvertently.1 35  Thus, the plain view doctrine could not justify its
seizure. 13  Indeed, procuring a valid warrant would not have been
impractical, and thus the officers' unfettered exercise of discretion
made the vacuum sweepings inadmissible.13
B. The Plurality's Formulation of the Inadvertence Requirement
In Coolidge, the plurality's insistence on inadvertent discovery as
a condition for plain view seizure a3 may be interpreted as an attempt
to reconcile crime control with privacy rights.3 9  In addressing the
State's argument that the police seized Coolidge's car under the plain
view exception to the warrant requirement, Justice Stewart reasoned
that plain view seizure could only be understood in light of the "two
distinct constitutional protections served by the warrant require-
ment."'" Therefore, the inadvertence requirement's primary func-
tion was to limit police discretion by preserving the Fourth
Amendment's warrant process.''
Plain view seizure, the Court reasoned, did not violate the first
conceded that Chimel did not govern because it only changed the law prospectively, and
Coolidge's car had been seized before Chimel was decided. Id. at 455-56. Pre-Chimel law
permitted officers to time arrests so that they could search a suspect's home or car. Id. at 471
n.27. Chimel's prohibition on the pretextual timing of a search incident to arrest was thus
irrelevant to the search in Coolidge. In the text of his opinion, Stewart provided a better
answer to Black's objections. He noted that even before Chimel, a search incident to an arrest
had to be conducted contemporaneously with the arrest-a requirement which had not been
satisfied in Coolidge because the car was not searched until two days after Coolidge's
apprehension. Id. at 456-58.
134. 434 U.S. at 458-64. The plurality reasoned that the facts in Coolidge did not
correspond to the rationale behind the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Id.
at 459-60. The police had expected to seize the car and had known of its location for some
time; consequently, they could have previously obtained a valid search warrant for the car. Id.
at 460. Because Coolidge's car was seized long after Coolidge realized that he was a murder
suspect, he previously obtained already had an opportuntiy to dispose of any evidence located
inside of it; thus, the evidence was not threatened by imminent destruction. Id. Furthermore,
Coolidge's car was seized while parked in his driveway, eliminating the threat to the evidence
posed by the inherent mobility of a car on a public roadway. Id.
135. Id at 472.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 472-73.
138. Id. at 470-71.
139. Stewart rationalized the plain view exception to the warrant requirement by
recognizing that while plain view seizure would result in a "major gain [to] law enforcement,"
it presented only a "minor peril" to privacy rights. Id. at 467.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 466-72.
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function of the warrant requirement-the prevention of all searches
and seizures not based on probable cause' 42-because "plain view
[seizure] does not occur until a search is in progress."1 43 By this, Jus-
tice Stewart meant that a policeman could only make a valid plain
view seizure if his initial intrusion on the suspect's privacy had been
authorized either by a search warrant or exigent circumstances.'
44
Moreover, the incriminating character of the plain view evidence had
to be "immediately apparent to the police," 145 insuring that the
officers had the requisite probable cause to make the seizure.
Furthermore, because only evidence located in plain view could
be seized, the plain view doctrine would not convert the search into a
"general or exploratory one," and therefore did not compromise the
second function of the warrant requirement-minimization of the
scope of searches and seizures through the description of "places to be
searched" and "things to be seized" in the warrant.' 46
Consequently, Justice Stewart concluded that while plain view
seizure did not jeopardize any Fourth Amendment rights, it resulted
in a "major gain in effective law enforcement."' 147 If evidence was
discovered in plain view during a lawful search, then requiring the
police to procure a warrant tailored to the new evidence would be a
"needless inconvenience" that could endanger both the evidence and
the police officers. 4 8
Despite the value of plain view seizure to effective law enforce-
ment, Justice Stewart reasoned that the doctrine was restricted by two
important qualifications, both of which implicated police discretion.
The first limitation required that police have lawful access to the evi-
dence that they seize in plain view149 -that is, they could not use the
plain view doctrine to justify the initiation of a search. 50 The second
limitation was that the police could seize only inadvertently discov-
142. Id
143. Id. at 467.
144. Id. at 465.
145. Id. at 466.
146. Id. at 467.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 467-68.
149. Id. at 468 ("[P]lain view seizure alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure
of evidence. . . . [N]o amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure
absent 'exigent circumstances.' "). Consequently, police can make a valid plain view seizure
only where their initial intrusion was either authorized by a warrant or required by an
exigency.
150. Id. ("But even where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly stated and
enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure."). Thus,
if a policeman sees a piece of evidence in a suspect's home through his window, the officer may
not use the plain view doctrine to enter the suspect's house without a warrant.
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ered evidence in plain view. 15' Where police, in the course of a lawful
search, unexpectedly encountered evidence that had not been
included in a warrant, they could seize it legally under the plain view
doctrine. However, the plurality expressed a limitation to the
doctrine:
But where the discovery is anticipated, where the police know in
advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situ-
ation is altogether different. The requirement of a warrant to seize
imposes no inconvenience whatever, or at least none which is con-
stitutionally cognizable in a legal system that regards warrantless
seizures as "per se unreasonable" in the absence of "exigent
circumstances."1 5
2
Where police had not anticipated finding the evidence seized in plain
view during a lawful search, they could not have intentionally initi-
ated the search for the sole of purpose of discovering the evidence.
Thus, the inadvertence requirement was tied directly to the curb on
police discretion provided by the Fourth Amendment's imposition of
a neutral magistrate between the policeman and the general public.
As plain view seizure of inadvertently discovered evidence did not
permit the unchecked free exercise of police judgment in either the
initiation or the execution of the search, it was justified as a helpful
tool for law enforcement. However, where the police did not discover
evidence inadvertently, the Fourth Amendment's warrant require-
ment outweighed any gain in crime control achieved by plain view
seizure; thus, plain view seizure ended where the Fourth Amend-
ment's limitations on unchecked police discretion began.
Convinced that the seizure of Coolidge's car was constitutional,
Justices Black' 53 and White' 54 each wrote vigorous dissents disputing
the constitutional relevance of the inadvertence requirement to plain
view seizure.' 55 The dissenters' debate regarding the inadvertence
requirement in Coolidge foreshadowed the skepticism of other courts
regarding inadvertence, which lasted until its internment in Horton v.
15 1. Id. at 469.
152. Id. at 470-71.
153. Id. at 493.
154. Id. at 510.
155. Justice Black commented:
The majority confidently states: "What the 'plain view' cases have in common is
that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in
the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused." But the prior holdings of this Court not only fail to
support the majority's statement, they flatly contradict it.
Id. at 506 (Black, J., dissenting). Further, Justice White noted: "The inadvertence rule is
unnecessary to further any Fourth Amendment ends and will accomplish nothing." Id. at 517
(White, J., dissenting).
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California.'56
Despite the vigorous dissent in Coolidge, "[florty-six states and
the District of Columbia and twelve United States Courts of Appeals"
subsequently adopted inadvertent discovery as a requirement for plain
view seizure.'M Thus, the Court's elimination of inadvertent discov-
ery in Horton v. California"8 is a dramatic revision of at least the
theoretical underpinnings of plain view seizure. The remainder of this
Comment depicts the evolution of the inadvertence requirement and
analyzes the logic and impact of Horton. Part IV details courts'
efforts to define and implement inadvertent discovery as an essential
element of plain view seizure, Part V evaluates the arguments
presented by both sides of the Court in Horton, and Part VI forecasts
the practical implications of Horton on American law enforcement.
IV. EVOLUTION OF THE INADVERTENCE REQUIREMENT
Criticism of the inadvertence requirement inCoolidge was imme-
diate and persistent. Initially, it focused on the plurality's failure to
define inadvertent discovery precisely.'59 Subsequently, courts strug-
gled to define the inadvertence requirement'6°-an odyssey which
continued until the abolition of inadvertent discovery in Horton v.
California. 161
A. Hare v. United States7 An Initial Interpretation of the
Inadvertence Requirement
Seizing upon Stewart's reference to the scenario where police had
advance knowledge of the evidence but had failed to obtain a war-
rant,162 in United States v. Hare, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that the inadvertence requirement was violated only
where police had probable cause to seize the evidence and made a
156. 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2301-11 (1990).
157. Id. at 2312 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
158. Id. at 2303-11.
159. See Kalven, supra note 5, at 244.
160. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 (1983); United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1293-
95 (6th Cir. 1979).
161. 110 S. Ct. at 2304-11.
162. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 470-71. The Court said:
But where the discovery is anticipated, where the police know in advance the
location of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is altogether different.
The requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience whatever, or at
least none which is constitutionally cognizable in a legal system that regards
warrantless seizures as "per se unreasonable" in the absence of "exigent
circumstances."
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warrantless seizure. 6 Therefore, a mere suspicion or hunch that evi-
dence was located within the scope of a lawful search satisfied the
inadvertence requirement, and police could seize the evidence under
the plain view doctrine."'
Such an interpretation of the plurality's position is fallacious.
Where police have actual knowledge of the existence of evidence and
then make a planned warrantless seizure, there is a prototypical viola-
tion of the inadvertence rule: police have used the plain view doctrine
as a facade to circumvent the warrant process. However, this scena-
rio does not exhaust the unlawful use of plain view seizure.165
Another likely example, which is equally violative of the warrant
requirement, is where police manipulate a warrant authorizing a
search for one piece evidence to enter a suspect's home and seize other
evidence that they had only suspected to find there. Thus, the princi-
pal point of contention concerning the use of the plain view doctrine
is that police should not be permitted to use it as a pretext to seize
evidence for which they lack probable cause to search in the first
place. Permitting them to do so nullifies the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition of arbitrarily initiated and executed searches-a principle
that drove the Coolidge plurality's position.
The warrant requirement mandates that the police present their
evidence, whether it amounts to probable cause or something less, to a
magistrate before they initiate a search. When police conduct a
search outside this judicial process and subsequently attempt to use
the plain view doctrine as a pretext to justify their actions, they act
unconstitutionally, regardless of the quality of their proof that the
163. Hare, 589 F.2d at 1294. In Hare, the ATF began investigating Hare after he was
arrested carrying a firearm registered to another individual. Id. at 1292. In the course of the
ATF's investigation, an ATF agent learned that the DEA was investigating Hare for violations
of narcotics laws. Id. The ATF agents obtained a warrant to search Hare's residence for
firearms, and invited DEA agents to accompany them during its execution. Id. After both
firearms and narcotics were seized during the search, Hare moved to suppress the evidence,
claiming the discovery of the narcotics was not inadvertent as required by the plain view
doctrine. Id. at 1292-93. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that because the DEA agents
lacked probable cause, they could not have obtained a warrant for narcotics; therefore, the
discovery of the narcotics was inadvertent within the meaning of the plain view doctrine. Id.
at 1295-98. The DEA agents had only suspected that narcotics would be discovered at Hare's
house. Despite the "hint of subterfuge... that the DEA was using [the] ATF to gain access to
a residence which they could not search on their own," the court found that the government
agents had not used plain view as a pretext to circumvent the warrant requirement. Id. at
1296.
164. Id. at 1294.
165. The Horton Court commented that "[i]f the officer has knowledge approaching
certainty that the item will be found, we see no reason why he or she would deliberately omit a
particular description of the item to be seized from the application [of the] warrant." Horton,
110 S. Ct. at 2309.
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suspect was engaged in criminal activity. Once police circumvent the
warrant requirement, it would be illogical to allow them to sterilize
their actions by claiming that they lacked probable cause to search for
the seized item in the first place.
Thus, not only did the Hare court misconstrue Coolidge, but its
interpretation of the inadvertence requirement warps the objectives of
the warrant requirement. The Fourth Amendment contemplates
detached, judicial evaluation of probable cause before the search, not
mechanical, antecedent approval of a police officer's suspicions. Pre-
vention of unjustified searches is the heart of the warrant require-
ment, 166 and a magistrate's rejection of an officer's request to conduct
a search in the absence of probable cause is the method of achieving
this objective. By holding that the police violated the inadvertence
requirement only if they had probable cause to search for the disputed
evidence but failed to obtain a warrant, the Sixth Circuit reduced judi-
cial scrutiny of probable cause to a mere formality.
B. Texas v. Brown." The Supreme Court's Link Between the
Inadvertence Requirement and Police Discretion
The Hare court's analysis of the inadvertence requirement is an
affront to the control on police discretion mandated by the Fourth
Amendment and correctly identified by the Coolidge plurality. The
goal of the inadvertence requirement was to limit police discretion by
preventing attempts to use plain view seizure as a facade. The
Supreme Court verified this interpretation of the plurality's inadver-
tence requirement in Texas v. Brown,1 67 which held that an analysis of
inadvertent discovery focused on whether the police had used "plain
view doctrine only as a pretense" for an unauthorized seizure.1 68
166. In Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), the Court stated:
The purpose of the warrant [requirement] is to allow a neutral judicial officer to
assess whether the police have probable cause to make an arrest or conduct a
search ....
A contrary conclusion-that the police, acting alone and in the absence of
exigent circumstances, may decide when there is sufficient justification for
searching the home of a third party for the subject of an arrest warrant-would
create a significant potential for abuse.
Id. at 212-16; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) ("We have long adhered
to the view that the warrant procedure minimizes the danger of needless intrusions."); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967) ("[T]he agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet the
inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial
officer. They were not required, before commencing the search, to present their estimate of
probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate.").
167. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
168. Id. at 743. After Brown was stopped at a routine driver's license checkpoint, officers
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Texas v. Brown accurately reflects the Coolidge plurality's concern
that police not use plain view seizure as a method to implement their
own arbitrary judgment and satiate their competitive impulses.
Because the Supreme Court itself defined the inadvertence require-
ment as a control on pretextual searches in Brown, the Court's subse-
quent elimination of inadvertent discovery in Horton makes citizens
more vulnerable to unbridled police discretion. 16 9
V. HORTON V. CALIFORNIA: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SCOPE
AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE INADVERTENCE
REQUIREMENT
In Horton v. California, the Supreme Court eliminated inadver-
tent discovery as a requirement for plain view seizure. 70 Writing for
the Court, Justice Stevens argued that "plain view alone is never
enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence."'7 1 In order to
seize evidence under the plain view doctrine, an officer must have "a
lawful right of access to the object itself."' 7 2 Therefore, even in the
absence of the inadvertence requirement, judicial enforcement of the
Fourth Amendment's scope requirement prevents unconstitutional
searches. 173 The Horton Court reasoned that if an officer confines his
search to its proper scope, then the inadvertence requirement will not
"reduce the number of places into which they may lawfully look."' 1 4
The invasion of the suspect's privacy will be the same whether the
discovered a balloon in his possession which contained heroin. Id. at 734. Brown moved to
suppress the narcotics evidence on the grounds that it could not be seized under the plain view
doctrine because it had not been discovered inadvertently. Id. at 735. On appeal, the Supreme
Court noted that only a plurality of the Court in Coolidge had required inadvertent discovery
and therefore, it was not binding as precedent. Id. at 737. Nevertheless, the Court addressed
the inadvertence requirement and held that it had been met because the police had not used the
roadblock as a pretext to search for and seize narcotics in plain view. Id. at 743; see also
Burkhoff, supra note 25, at 546-48.
169. See infra part VI.
170. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2310-11. Recall that Horton was convicted of armed robbery
after the police seized the weapons used in the crime from his residence. Id. at 2304-05.
Although the police had included both the proceeds and weapons in their affidavit for a search
warrant, the warrant only authorized them to search for the stolen property. Id. at 2304.
Since the police had suspected that the weapons would also be found in Horton's home, "the
seized evidence was not discovered inadvertently." Id. at 2305. Nevertheless, the Court ruled
that the weapons had been properly seized under the plain view doctrine. Id. at 2311.
171. Id. at 2307 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971)).
172. Id. at 2308.
173. Id. at 2309 ("[T]he suggestion that the inadvertence requirement is necessary to
prevent the police from conducting general searches, or from converting specific warrants into
general warrants, is not persuasive because that interest is already served by the requirement
that no warrant issues unless it 'particularly describ[es] the place to be searched and the person
or things to be seized.'" (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V)).
174. Id. at 2310.
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evidence is discovered inadvertently or purposefully. Moreover, if a
police officer conducts a search that breaches the scope prescribed by
a warrant or permitted by an exigency, then the seizure is unconstitu-
tional on that ground alone, and an analysis of inadvertent discovery
is superfluous. 175
175. Id. The Horton Court also argued that the inadvertence requirement produced
illogical results. For example, if an officer had a warrant authorizing a search for a rifle, and
he found two photographs--one incriminating photograph which he had expected to find and
a second, identical one whose discovery he had not anticipated-then the inadvertence rule
would prohibit seizure of the first photograph only. The Court considered these different
outcomes irrational because the seizure of each photograph caused an equivalent interference
in respect to the suspect's property rights. Furthermore, the reliability of the evidence and the
inconvenience of obtaining a warrant were the same under either scenario. Id. at 2309.
This argument, however, is flawed. Admittedly, the seizure of the deliberately discovered
evidence results in an equivalent intrusion on the suspect's property rights as the seizure of the
inadvertently found evidence. Nevertheless, the planned seizure is an incremental intrusion on
possessory interests-two items of evidence are seized rather than one-that must be
supported by probable cause and authorized by either a warrant or exigency. An unlawful
seizure cannot be justified by a mere reference to its similarity to another lawful seizure.
Under some circumstances, the risk that the second item of evidence will be destroyed or
removed while police obtain a second warrant may create an exigency that will support a
warrantless seizure of that evidence. However, the police can diminish, or even eliminate, this
threat to the evidence if they arrest the suspect or block off access to his house until they
procure the necessary warrant and seize the rest of the evidence. Moreover, enamored with
the similarities between intentionally and inadvertently discovered evidence, the Court ignores
a critical distinction between the two-the increase in police discretion. This element justifies
suppression of evidence seized by choice and permits seizure of evidence found by chance.
When police suspect that they will find evidence in a suspect's home but lack probable cause to
search for it, a subsequent plain view seizure of that evidence suggests subterfuge, especially
when the police use a warrant authorizing a search for an entirely different item to enter the
suspect's home. Such activity implies that the police are using the plain view doctrine as a
facade to avoid judicial review of their probable cause to search for the evidence seized in plain
view. See State v. Hamilton, 573 A.2d 1197 (Conn. 1990) (discovery of van keys not listed in
warrant was not inadvertant within the meaning of plain view); Lockhart v. State, 305 S.E.2d
22 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (use of narcotics dog was outside scope of search for untaxed whiskey);
Hewell v. State, 471 N.E.2d 1235 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (plain view did exception did not justify
officers' seizure of silver items not described in warrant); State v. White, 361 S.E.2d 301 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1987) (stolen goods not listed in warrant were not discovered inadvertantly and thus
not subject to seizure under plain view exception); Fritz v. State, 730 P.2d 530 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1986) (seizure of credit cards not listed in warrant was unlawful). Thus, police
manipulation of plain view seizure requires the police to have a hunch that evidence will be
found in plain view even though it has been omitted from the warrant that authorizes their
search. But when evidence is inadvertently discovered in plain view, the police, a fortiori, lack
this requisite advance suspicion. The definition of inadvertence implies that when the police
applied for a search warrant, they were unaware that other evidence would be discovered in
plain view. Consequently, they could not have used the plain view doctrine as a pretense to
avoid the warrant requirement, and police discretion is not at issue. Despite the Horton
Court's assertion that there is no material difference between inadvertent seizure of evidence
and seizure of evidence which has been deliberately sought, inadvertent discovery is a reliable
indicator of pretext and police discretion. E.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 (1983); see
also Burkhoff, supra note 25, at 546-48. Thus, the Horton Court assumes its own conclusion:
because there is no difference between inadvertently discovered evidence and evidence which
the police expect to find, the inadvertence requirement is not an essential element of plain view
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In response to the majority's argument that judicial enforcement
of scope adequately protects Fourth Amendment rights, the dissent
countered that the inadvertence requirement is necessary to prevent a
police officer from manipulating the scope of the warrant by "listing
only one or two hard-to-find items [in the affidavit for the warrant],
... confident that he will find in plain view all the other evidence he is
looking for before he discovers the listed items."' 7 6 After discovering
evidence in plain view, either by choice or by chance, the officer could
always claim that he had been searching for the small, easily con-
cealed items listed in warrant. Thus, the Fourth Amendment's man-
date that a warrant "particularly describ[ing] the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized" could facilitate rather than
limit police discretion, pending an evaluation of pretext.
Analysis of cases where courts suppressed evidence because it
was omitted from a warrant indicates that judicial enforcement of
scope inadequately protects privacy rights from police discretion. 77
seizure. The Court disregards the capacity for the abuse of police discretion implicated by a
planned seizure of evidence in plain view-a danger which is necessarily absent during an
inadvertent seizure of evidence. Dismissing this distinction, the Court legitimizes all plain
view seizures as long as the officer's search conforms to the scope dictated by a warrant or an
exigency. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2309.
176. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2313 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent also contended that
elimination of the inadvertence requirement would jeopardize the protection of property rights
provided by the Fourth Amendment's mandate that a warrant particularly describe the things
to be seized, as well as the places to be searched. The warrant requirement protects two
independent interests from police discretion. By requiring a particular description of the
places to be searched, a warrant preserves the privacy rights of individual citizens. By
demanding a particular description of the things to be seized, the warrant requirement
prevents police from arbitrarily invading a suspect's property rights. The inadvertence
requirement does not protect privacy interests because it does not limit the number or type of
places that a police officer may search. However, because it precludes police from
indiscriminately seizing items not included in a warrant, the inadvertence requirement protects
possessory interests. By abolishing the inadvertence requirement, therefore, the majority
"eliminates a rule designed to further possessory interests on the ground that it fails to further
privacy interests." Id. at 2311-13; see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987)
("Although the interest protected by the Fourth Amendment injunction against unreasonable
searches is quite different from that protected by its injunction against unreasonable seizures,
neither the one nor the other is of inferior worth or necessarily requires lesser protection.");
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985) ("A search occurs when 'an expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to reasonable is infringed.'. . . A seizure occurs when 'there is
some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests' in the property seized."
(quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)); Amsterdam, supra note 35, at
411 (The warrant "requirement of particularity of description of things is important to note,
for it shows that even when there is sufficient cause to intrude upon an individual by a search,
the framers decreed that it was unreasonable and should be unconstitutional to subject his
premises or possessions to indiscriminate seizure.").
177. See State v. Hamilton, 573 A.2d 1197 (Conn. 1990) (holding that a set of van keys
which had not been included in a warrant authorizing a search for narcotics could not be
seized under the plain view doctrine because its discovery had not been inadvertent); Hewell v.
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When a warrant authorizes a search of a suspect's home for either
stolen jewelry 178 or cash,'79 there are few places in which a police
officer may not search. Because the items are small and can be con-
cealed in any drawer or behind any door, searches can be extensive
and intrusive.18 0 Thus, a search warrant for the proceeds of a robbery
will often authorize the investigating officer to invade a suspect's pri-
vacy in an all-compassing manner, subject only to the officer's discre-
tion. Furthermore, if the warrant empowers the police to search for
firearms, either as fruits' 8 ' or instrumentalities' 2 of a crime, then a
suspect's privacy rights are also at the mercy of a police officer's
whims. A suspect's ingenuity is the only limitation on the number
and type of places where he can store small firearms. 8 3 When police
search a suspect's home for contraband under the authority of a war-
rant, moreover, they are also free to exercise their own discretion in
identifying the places to be searched.' 4 Narcotics are so difficult to
find,8 5 that occasionally police must rely on specially trained narcot-
ics dogs to detect illicit drugs. 1 6 Furthermore, once police discover
narcotics or proceeds, they will not immediately terminate their
State, 471 N.E.2d 1235 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that plain view exception did not justify
officer's seizure of silver items not described in warrant); State v. White, 361 S.E.2d 301 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1987) (holding that stolen property, which had been omitted from a warrant
authorizing a search for other stolen property, had not been inadvertently found and could not
be seized under the plain view doctrine); Fritz v. State, 730 P.2d 530 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986)
(holding that credit cards, which had not been included in a warrant that authorized a search
for other proceeds from a robbery, could not be seized under the plain view doctrine because
they had not been inadvertently found); State v. Albright, 418 N.W.2d 292 (S.D. 1988)
(holding that stolen property omitted from a warrant authorizing a search for other stolen
property could not be seized under the plain view doctrine).
178. See, e.g., White, 361 S.E.2d at 306; Hewell, 471 N.E.2d at 1237.
179. See, e.g., Fritz, 730 P.2d at 532.
180. Hewell, 471 N.E.2d at 1237 (search for stolen jewelry took 17 hours and involved 20
police officers).
181. In the law of evidence, "fruits of a crime" are "material objects acquired by means and
in consequence of the commission of a crime, and sometimes constituting the subject matter of
the crime." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 670 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, when a suspect steals a
firearm during the course of a robbery or burglary, the stolen firearm is considered a fruit of
the crime. See, e.g., White, 361 S.E.2d at 306.
182. An "instrumentality" is "[s]omething by which an end is achieved; a means, medium,
agency." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (6th ed. 1990). Therefore, when a suspect uses a
firearm as a weapon while committing a crime, the firearm is an instrumentality of the crime.
See, e.g., Fritz, 730 P.2d at 532.
183. Eg., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (shotgun and a pistol discovered in
the flushtank of a toilet and under a mattress).
184. See, e.g., State v. Hamilton, 573 A.2d 1197 (Conn. 1990).
185. See, e.g., id. at 1205 (detectives found "crack" cocaine packaged in small vials in a
suspect's van); People v. Miller, 242 Cal. Rptr. 179 (Ct. App. 1987) (narcotics discovered in a
hidden, locked safe in the suspect's bedroom).
186. See Lockhart v. State, 305 S.E.2d 22, 23 (Ga. App. Ct. 1983) (narcotics canine located
marijuana in a water reservoir and in a bedroom chest drawer)
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search. Rather, they will continue their investigation until they are
satisfied that they have discovered all the illicit drugs or money.
Thus, when the police can establish probable cause to search for cash,
contraband, jewelry, or firearms, a warrant's scope provides minimal
security of a suspect's right to privacy.
Despite recognizing that judicial enforcement of a warrant's
scope was not an adequate substitute for the inadvertence require-
ment,"8 7 the Horton dissent downplayed the inadvertence require-
ment's role in preventing pretextual searches.' Indeed, the threat of
police discretion is minimal in cases like Horton. In Horton, the pro-
ceeds, which were included in the warrant, and the weapons, which
were discovered in plain view, tied Horton to a single crime-the rob-
bery.189 Furthermore, the officers' affidavit requested permission to
search for both the weapons and the proceeds;1 90 consequently, the
officers adhered to the warrant process and did not attempt to use the
plain view doctrine to circumvent the Fourth Amendment. The
Court concluded that the officers had probable cause to search for
both the weapons and the proceeds, 19' implying that the magistrate
had inadvertently failed to include the weapons in the warrant. Hor-
ton, therefore, was correctly decided, and its holding does not jeop-
ardize Fourth Amendment rights when police procure a warrant to
search for one type of evidence and discover other related evidence in
plain view. When officers can establish probable cause to a search a
suspect's home for evidence of a single crime, they usually have prob-
able cause to search for all the evidence of that crime,' 92 and thus
have no incentive to enlarge their authority by manipulating scope
and relying on the plain view doctrine as a mere pretext.
However, when two sets of police officers conduct independent
investigations of a suspect's unrelated criminal activity,193 and one set
187. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2313 (1990) (Brennan J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 2313-14 ("Fortunately, this decision should have only a limited impact, for the
Court is not confronted today with what lower courts have described as a 'pretextual search'
... [E]ven state courts that have rejected the inadvertent discovery requirement have held that
the Fourth Amendment prohibits pretextual searches." (citations omitted)).
189. Id. at 2304-05.
190. Id. at 2304.
191. Id. at 2310-11. (The officers had "probable cause, not only to obtain a warrant to
search for stolen property, but also to believe that the weapons and handguns had been used in
the crime he was investigating.").
192. See, e.g., id. at 2310-11; People v. Miller, 242 Cal. Rptr. 179, 180 (Ct. App. 1987)
(federal agents established probable cause to search for "any property which constituted
evidence of the offense."); People v. Albritton, 187 Cal.Rptr. 652, 653 (Ct. App. 1982)
(narcotics officers establish probable cause to search for any articles or items showing that the
suspect was involved in the sale of narcotics).
193. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 243 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (burglary
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of officers lacks probable cause to conduct a search, the temptation to
evade the warrant process through the pretextual use of the plain view
doctrine increases.1 94 After Horton, courts will initially focus their
examination of pretext on whether the officer's search conformed to
the scope of the warrant. Because the scope of a warrant to search for
illicit narcotics, small firearms, or common proceeds often does not
limit an officer's discretion, courts must resort to pretextual search
tests based on objective criteria, such as the Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
cuit tests. 95 Thus, it is helpful to examine the relationship between
the now-defunct inadvertance requirement and police cooperation in
determining whether a given search is pretextual.
VI. THE CALIFORNIA MODEL: INTERACTION BETWEEN THE
INADVERTENCE REQUIREMENT, POLICE COOPERATION,
AND PRETEXTUAL SEARCHES
When police use a warrant to search for evidence of an unrelated
crime, the dangers of police discretion are particularly acute. A
necessity of contemporary law enforcement-pooling manpower and
data between different police divisions and departments-impairs the
courts' ability to identify this pretextual use of the plain view doc-
trine. Faced with an increasing crime rate and a new breed of sophis-
ticated criminals, police agencies that investigate different types of
crime often share personnel and information to maximize their
resources. 96 In some police departments, this cooperation is stan-
officers investigating stolen property and narcotics officers investigating drug trafficking
charges); Miller, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 179 (federal secret service agents investigating allegations of
counterfeiting while city narcotics officers investigating drug trafficking charges); Albritton,
187 Cal.Rptr. at 652 (officer investigating allegations of auto theft while narcotics officers were
investigating drug trafficking charges).
194. See, e.g., Albritton, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
195. See supra notes 76-107 and accompanying text.
196. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (state police officers
assisted customs agents in on-board ship documentation investigations); United States v.
Medlin, 842 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1988) (county deputy sheriff assisted ATF agents in search
for stolen firearms); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (Florida Highway
Patrol officer collaborated with DEA agents in operation to apprehend drug couriers); United
States v. Wright, 667 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1982) (state narcotics officers assisted ATF agents in
executing search warrant for a driver's license); United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir.
1979) (DEA agents assisted ATF agents in executing search for firearms); Williams, 243 Cal.
Rptr. at 915 (burglary detectives aided narcotics officers in serving a warrant to search for
narcotics); Miller, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 180 (city police officer assisted agents of Federal Secret
Service in search for counterfeit currency); Albritton, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 653 (officer assigned to
auto theft detail assisted narcotics officers in a search for narcotics); Lockhart v. State, 305
S.E.2d 22 (Ga. App. Ct. 1983) (narcotics canine units assisted county sheriffs in executing a
search warrant for illicit whiskey); State v. Harris, 504 So. 2d 156 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (sheriff
who arrested suspect for reckless driving requested the assistance of a narcotics officer to
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dard operating procedure.' 97 Statutes permit some of this collabora-
tion, 198 such as local police assistance of federal agents in the
execution of a warrant,' 99 or federal agencies' collaboration.2 °" The
danger posed by the interaction between contemporary police proce-
dure, pretextual searches, and the new plain view doctrine is illus-
trated by three California cases: People v. Albritton,2"' People v.
Miller,202 and People v. Williams.20
A. People v. Albritton
In Albritton, narcotics officers obtained a warrant to search
Albritton's residence for illicit drugs,2" and requested that Detective
Boggs, who was assigned to the auto theft detail,205 assist them in the
search. 206 However, once the search had commenced, Boggs sepa-
rated himself from the narcotics officers and immediately proceeded
to Albritton's garage.2 °7 Inside the garage, Boggs located eight stolen
motor vehicles, which he seized.208 At Albritton's trial, Boggs testi-
fied that prior to search, he had suspected that Albritton was dealing
in stolen vehicles and was aware of Albritton's past arrests for posses-
search the suspect's car for illegal drugs); State v. Vann, 432 N.W.2d 810 (Neb. 1988) (theft
investigation officers assisted narcotics officers in executing a felony arrest warrant for theft).
197. See United States v. Medlin, 842 F.2d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 1988) (ATF agents
routinely take along local police officers when executing search warrants); Williams, 243 Cal.
Rptr. at 915 ("Usually, when additional manpower was required by the narcotics detail in
executing a warrant, normal procedure was to contact the lieutenant in charge of the detective
division, or, if he was unavailable, to go to one of the sergeants in charge of various details and
ask for 'anybody' who might be available."); Miller, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 180 (field office of United
States Secret Service had only four agents and "routinely" relied on other agencies to assist the
office when needed).
198. For example:
A search warrant may in all cases be served by any of the officers mentioned in
its direction or by an officer authorized by law to serve such warrant, but by no
other person, except in the aid of the officer on his requiring it, he being present
and acting in its execution.
18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1988). The method of executing the warrant, including the cooperation
between different law enforcement agencies and departments, is left to the officers' discretion.
See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979); United States v. Wright, 667 F.2d 793,
797 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1306 (8th Cir. 1972).
199. See Medlin, 842 F.2d at 1194.
200. See United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1979).
201. 187 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Ct. App. 1982).
202. 242 Cal. Rptr. 179 (Ct. App. 1987).
203. 243 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Ct. App. 1988).
204. Albritton, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
205. Id. at 657.
206. Id. at 653.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 654.
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sion of stolen property.2° After an unsuccessful attempt to suppress
this evidence, Albritton pled guilty to receiving stolen property but
reserved his objection regarding the constitutionality of the search. 2,0
On appeal, the State argued that Boggs had seized the stolen
vehicles lawfully under the plain view doctrine.2 ' However, the
court held that because Boggs had expected to find the stolen vehicles
in Albritton's garage, he had not discovered them inadvertently.21 2
Instead, Boggs had used the narcotics warrant as a "pretext to gain
entry to the premises for the purpose of conducting a general explora-
tory search for stolen vehicles. ' 213  The court reversed Albritton's
conviction, holding that the the lower court had erred in denying
Albritton's motion to suppress the inadmissible evidence.214
In reversing the conviction, the court relied on both objective
and subjective indicia of pretext. It partially relied on Boggs' subjec-
tive intent-his testimony that he had knowledge of Albritton's pre-
vious arrest for possession of stolen property, as well as his
expectation that he would find the stolen vehicles in Albritton's
garage-as proof that he had pretextually used the narcotics warrant
and the plain view doctrine.21 5
In addition, when viewed objectively, Boggs' actions also indi-
cated that he had used the narcotics warrant and the plain view doc-
trine as a pretext. Although Boggs' worked the auto theft detail, he
had accompanied narcotics detectives on a search for illicit drugs and
then had discovered stolen property.2 6 Furthermore, he immediately
searched Albritton's garage-a sensible location to store stolen vehi-
cles but an unlikely place to hide narcotics-while the narcotics
officers proceeded to the main house.217
Given the court's emphasis on the warrant's scope,21 8 its decision
209. Id. at 653-54.
210. Id. at 653.
211. Id. at 655.
212. Id. at 657. In holding that plain view seizures in California required inadvertent
discovery of evidence, the Albritton court ignored North v. Superior Court, 502 P.2d 1305
(Cal. 1972). In North, the Supreme Court of California held that there was no inadvertence
requirement for plain-view seizure in California. Id. at 1308-09. Five years later, another
California appellate court dismissed Albritton as precedent, noting the discrepancy between
Albritton and North. People v. Miller, 242 Cal. Rptr. 179, 183 (Ct. App. 1987).
213. Albritton, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 658.
214. Id. at 653.
215. Id. at 657.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. "The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution ... require[s] that the
warrant particularly describe the thing or property to be seized.... The police are foreclosed
from seizing items indiscriminately." Id. at 656.
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must be read as a reaction to Boggs' attempt to supplant his discretion
for that of a neutral, detached magistrate in an attempt to circumvent
the warrant requirement and conduct his search for stolen property.
The court thwarted his efforts by insisting that only inadvertently dis-
covered evidence may be seized under the plain view doctrine. Thus,
Albritton can be read as holding that inadvertent discovery or the lack
thereof determines whether an officer had used the plain view doctrine
as a pretext and had indulged his own suspicions outside the warrant
requirement.
B. People v. Miller
People v. Miller,2" 9 decided five years later, demonstrated that
when the inadvertence requirement for plain view seizure is ignored
and police cooperation is institutionalized, it becomes difficult to
detect and deter dubious searches. In Miller, Agent Stribling of the
United States Secret Service claimed that his agency lacked the neces-
sary manpower to execute a search warrant on Miller's home for evi-
dence of counterfeiting. Therefore, following well-entrenched agency
policy, he requested the assistance of San Jose narcotics officers.220
Two city narcotics detectives, Hyland and Micelli, who had con-
ducted their own unsuccessful independent investigation into suspi-
cions of Miller's narcotics trafficking,22 joined the search of Miller's
residence for evidence of counterfeiting. As a result of the search, the
officers and agents seized cocaine as well machines used to print coun-
terfeit money, both of which were found in plain view.222 After Miller
unsuccessfully moved to suppress the narcotics, he pled guilty to
cocaine possession.223 On appeal, Miller challenged the state's use of
the plain view doctrine on two grounds: the discovery of narcotics
had not been inadvertent, and the city narcotics officers had used the
warrant to search for evidence of counterfeiting as a pretext to pursue
their narcotics investigation.224
The California Court of Appeal for the Sixth District, holding
219. 242 Cal. Rptr. 179 (Ct. App. 1987).
220. Id. at 180. Stribling testified that the Secret Service Field Office was staffed by only
four agents and, therefore, "routinely" relied on other agencies such as local police
departments to assist in serving search warrants. Id.
221. Prior to the search for counterfeiting evidence, Hyland had twice placed Miller's
residence under surveillance to gather evidence on narcotics trafficking, but did not observe
suspicious activity. Id. Furthermore, this investigation was prompted by a tip from Stribling,
the Secret Service agent, that Miller was dealing in narcotics. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 179.
224. Id. at 181.
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that North v. Superior Court22 5 had eliminated inadvertent discovery
as a requirement for plain view seizure, quickly disposed of Miller's
first argument, 226 and proceeded to address Miller's contention that
the search had been pretextual. 22" Emphasizing that the local Secret
Service office "routinely relied on outside agencies for assistance when
needed," the court held that the narcotics detectives had conducted
their search in good faith.228 Furthermore, Hyland, the narcotics
officer, had been directed to search for counterfeiting evidence and
had confined his search to its appropriate scope.229
The conduct of the law enforcement officers in Miller, however,
suggests subterfuge. Because Stribling, the Secret Service agent, had
originally notified Micelli, a city narcotics detective, that Miller pos-
sessed illegal drugs, 230 Stribling must have known of the narcotics
officers' desire to search Miller's home for contraband when he
requested their assistance. Moreover, after two unsuccessful surveil-
lances of Miller's residence, the narcotics detectives must have real-
ized that they lacked probable cause to search Miller's residence for
illicit drugs. Instead of excusing themselves from the search, how-
ever, Hyland and Micelli readily joined Stribling in his search for
counterfeiting evidence. In addition, Stribling did not ask for any spe-
cific officers when he requested Micelli's assistance. 23' Therefore,
Micelli, knowing that Hyland had failed to accumulate sufficient evi-
dence to obtain a narcotics search warrant on his own, must have
approached Hyland personally to participate in the search for coun-
terfeiting evidence. Viewed as an aggregate, the law officers' and
agent's actions in Miller suggest a conspiracy to circumvent the
Fourth Amendment by avoiding a judicial review of probable cause to
search for narcotics.
Admittedly, this interpretation of the officer's behavior is some-
what speculative. Nevertheless, Miller does illustrate that institution-
alized cooperation between law enforcement officers makes it easier to
validate any questionable behavior conduct ex-ante and more difficult
to detect pretextual searches. At best, in the absence of the
inadvertant discovery requirement for plain view seizure, this new
trend weakens the Fourth Amendment protection against unbridled
225. 502 P.2d 1305 (Cal. 1972).
226. Miller, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
227. Id. at 182-83.
228. Id. at 183.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 180.
231. Id.
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police discretion. At worst, this trend jeopardizes the personal pri-
vacy rights of everyone, not merely criminal suspects.
Even the Eleventh Circuit's pretextual search test, which asks
whether a "reasonable officer would have made the seizure in the
absence of illegitimate motivation," '232 becomes difficult to apply when
cooperation between police departments is regularized. For example,
prior to the institutionalization of police cooperation, Hyland's pres-
ence during a search for evidence of counterfeiting-a crime unre-
lated to his primary law enforcement responsibilities-would have
constituted powerful objective evidence of pretext.233 Under normal
circumstances, without the history of institutionalized cooperation,
Hyland would not even have been present during a search for evi-
dence of counterfeiting; therefore, he would not have seized the nar-
cotics without an illicit motivation to circumvent the warrant
requirement. Under the Eleventh Circuit test, this would likely prove
that the search was pretextual, resulting in suppression of evidence.23 1
Institutionalization of police cooperation in executing warrants
frustrates the Eleventh Circuit test's ability to detect pretextual
searches by obscuring an officer's illicit motivations. If narcotics
officers such as Hyland routinely assist federal agents in serving war-
rants to search for evidence of counterfeiting, then the officer's pres-
ence during the search is not objective evidence of pretext. Even in
the absence of the alleged illicit motivation-a desire to search for
narcotics without probable cause-a "reasonable" narcotics officer
would adhere to police policy, accompany the federal agents on their
search for evidence of counterfeiting, and seize any illicit drugs dis-
covered in plain view. Therefore, once police cooperation is standard-
ized, it becomes difficult to distinguish conscientious police work from
unconstitutional police discretion. Even though the policy of interde-
partmental cooperation may have provided the narcotics officers with
the opportunity to circumvent the warrant requirement, it becomes
objective evidence of the narcotics officers' honest motives in joining
the search. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit's focus on the hypothetical
"reasonable officer" blurs the pretext question when officers from dif-
ferent departments execute a single search warrant. Indeed, its test
creates a potential for pretextual searches when the cooperating
officers conduct independent investigations of a suspect's unrelated
criminal activity.
Even if Secret Service Agent Stribling had obtained a warrant to
232. United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (1 th Cir. 1986).
233. See, e.g., People v. Albritton, 187 Cal. Rptr. 652, 657 (Ct. App. 1982).
234. See, e.g., Smith, 799 F.2d at 711.
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search for evidence of counterfeiting for the sole purpose of facilitat-
ing an illegal search for narcotics, the Eleventh Circuit test would
have admitted the seized printing machine as evidence because Strib-
ling had probable cause and a warrant to search for evidence of coun-
terfeiting, 23" and he confined the search to its appropriate scope.236
Seizure of the printing machine was lawful. The Eleventh Circuit test
does not prohibit legitimate law enforcement efforts; it only targets
"illicit motivation," for example, the officers' desire to search for con-
trolled substances outside of the warrant process in Miller. If the nar-
cotics officers searched for the cocaine without probable cause and a
warrant, then they indulged their own discretion at the expense of the
Fourth Amendment; however, the court should only suppress the
seized drugs.
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit test, which only prohibits a search
and seizure if the officer lacked the legal authority to conduct the
investigation, 237 essentially makes an analysis of pretext unnecessary.
If the officer lacked the authority to initiate his investigation at its
outset, then the search and seizure are illegal even if he was not
attempting to use the plain doctrine as a pretext.
Furthermore, because the Fifth Circuit's pretextual search test
bases its determination on whether the officer could have conducted a
particular search,23 it does not detect pretextual searches when
police derive their authority to search from a warrant obtained by
different department. The Fifth Circuit validates a policeman's
search as long as he proffers adequate authority for his actions.239
Therefore, in a situation like Miller, where the narcotics officers
claimed that their search was sanctioned by the warrant authorizing a
search for evidence of counterfeiting, the Fifth Circuit would hold
that their seizure of narcotics was lawful even if the officers had used
the warrant as a mere pretext to search for the drugs, because they
235. Miller, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
236. Id. at 183. "The warrant authorized seizure of 'counterfeit currency, the means and
instruments used in acquiring, manufacturing and disposing of such counterfeit currency,
including but not limited to paper, plates, inks, colors, negatives, photographic equipment,
cutting materials, and all property that constitutes evidence of the offense.'" Id. at 180.
Because counterfeit money and the plates used in its manufacture could be concealed in any
receptacle, the warrant imposed only minimal scope restrictions. The court held that the
search was "completely consistent with a search for the items listed in the warrant." Id. at 183.
237. United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1987).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1185. Suspecting Causey of bank robbery, the police arrested him on an
outstanding warrant for petty theft. Id. After his arrest, they immediately interrogated him
about the bank robbery, and secured a confession. Id. at 1180. The court held that because
Causey had been arrested on a valid warrant, the police had not exceeded their authority in
questioning him about the bank robbery. Id. at 1184.
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had indisputable authority to search for items associated with coun-
terfeiting and limited their search to places where such evidence could
be concealed.
The Fifth Circuit test allows the state to refute any allegations of
pretext by relying on the allegedly pretextual source of authority
itself, such as the warrant to search for counterfeiting evidence in
Miller. But the seizure of the counterfeiting evidence was not at issue
in Miller; it was the legality of the seizure of narcotics that was in
dispute. Miller conceded that the police were authorized to search for
items associated with counterfeiting, but he challenged their authority
to parlay that power into a search for narcotics. Consequently, reli-
ance on the warrant to search for evidence of counterfeiting ignores
the crucial issue: did the officers use one source of authority as a
facade to pursue their own suspicions outside the warrant process?
The Fifth Circuit test merely begs the question whether a search was
pretextual. Thus, when two police departments execute a single war-
rant, their shared authority under the Warrant renders the Fifth Cir-
cuit's test obsolete. Regardless of an officer's devious intentions, such
as the desire to seize narcotics rather than counterfeiting evidence in
plain view, the warrant makes his conduct invulnerable to allegations
of pretext. By blindly accepting a police officer's justification for his
behavior, the Fifth Circuit forecloses the possibility of ever detecting
pretextual behavior. Therefore, in the absence of the inadvertence
requirement, widespread adoption of the Fifth Circuit pretextual
search test will undermine constitutional protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures.
C. People v. Williams
Without the inadvertence requirement, courts will rely on objec-
tive facts as the sole indicia of pretext and evaluate the probative
value of these facts within the context of the entire search. A compar-
ison of People v. Albritton2" and People v. Williams241 reveals a cru-
cial defect in the contemporary use of objective facts as the sole
indicator of pretext: different courts will attach different weights to
the same objective facts.
In Williams, burglary detectives Hackney and Porter seized a
large quantity of stolen property found in plain view while assisting
narcotics detectives in a search of Williams' home for illicit drugs.242
240. 187 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Ct. App. 1982).
241. 243 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Ct. App. 1988).
242. Id. at 915. The narcotics department claimed that it lacked adequate manpower to
conduct the search and, therefore, required the assistance of the burglary department. Id.
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Prior to the search, the narcotics and burglary detectives had dis-
cussed by telephone2 43 their ongoing, independent investigations244 of
Williams. The trial court granted Williams' motion to suppress the
stolen property.245
On the government's appeal, Williams renewed his argument
that the officers had used the narcotics search warrant as a pretext to
search for stolen property.246 However, the appellate court held that
the search was not pretextua 247 and that the trial court had erred in
suppressing the stolen property recovered from Williams' home.2 48
The factual similarities between Albritton and Williams are strik-
ing, and both cases were decided by the California Court of Appeal
for the Fifth District. In both cases, officers assigned to different divi-
sions within a single police department were investigating unrelated
criminal activity of a single suspect. Furthermore, both the auto theft
officer in Albritton and the burglary officers in Williams believed that
a suspect was dealing in stolen property, but lacked probable cause to
obtain a search warrant.249 In each case, the theft detectives accom-
panied narcotics officers on a search for drugs-an offense which was
unrelated to their primary law enforcement responsibilities-and con-
firmed their suspicions by seizing stolen property found in plain view
while executing a proper warrant for an unrelated offense.
In addition, before the search in Williams, the police officers
repeatedly exchanged information about their mutual suspect-a
strong indicator of pretext totally absent in Albritton. Hackney's call
to the narcotics division250 put the narcotics officers on notice of the
burglary division's desire to search Williams' home for stolen prop-
This type of cooperation was normal police procedure. Id. The search warrant procured by
the narcotics detectives authorized them to search for "cocaine and drug-related paraphernalia
only." Id.
243. Id. at 916-17. After telling other burglary officers that he wanted to search Williams'
home for stolen property but lacked probable cause to obtain a search warrant, Porter notified
narcotics officers that he suspected Williams of fencing stolen property. Id. at 916. Several
days later, the narcotics officers contacted Porter to obtain standard information about
Williams so that they could procure a search warrant for narcotics. Id. at 917. When cross-
examined at Williams' trial about the suspicious timing of this request, Porter was unable to
explain why the narcotics officers had specifically called him to supply this data. Id.
244. Id. at 916. On separate occasions, the two burglary detectives entered Williams' home
without a warrant, but neither of them discovered any stolen property. Id.
245. Id. at 915.
246. Id. at 919.
247. Id. at 921.
248. Id. at 925.
249. Recall that in Williams, the burglary officers had conducted unsuccessful, warrantless
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erty. When the narcotics officers phoned Porter, another burglary
officer, to collect information for a narcotics search warrant,25" ' they
sent a clear signal to the burglary detail that they planned to enter
Williams' residence. Furthermore, the narcotics division's request for
assistance was a conspicuous invitation for Hackney and Porter to
join the search-an enticement they eagerly exploited. Thus, the
interaction between the burglary and narcotics officers in Williams
prior to the search indicated that they were working in concert to
overcome their lack of probable cause to search Williams' residence
for stolen property. In this respect, Williams was an even stronger
candidate for a finding of pretext than Albritton.
Despite the similarities and differences between the two cases and
the stronger evidence of pretext in Williams, the California Court of
Appeal for the Fifth Circuit, which decided both cases, reached seem-
ingly contradictory results. It held that the auto theft officer in Albrit-
ton had conducted an illegal pretextual search,252 but the burglary
officers in Williams had not 2 3 despite stronger indications of bad
faith. The apparent inconsistency is difficult, but not impossible, to
harmonize.254 The Williams court was not constrained by the plain
view doctrine's inadvertence requirement; therefore, the institutional-
ized cooperation between the burglary and narcotics divisions allowed
it to attach different weight to the same objective indicators of pretext
that existed in Albritton.
Williams' discussion of the inadvertence requirement of plain
view seizure is ironic: had the officers discovered the stolen property
inadvertently, they probably would not have been able to seize it in
plain view. The court reasoned that because the officers had repeat-
edly received information that Williams was storing property in his
251. Id. at 917.
252. People v. Albritton, 187 Cal. Rptr. 652, 658 (Ct. App. 1982).
253. Williams, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
254. The Williams court attempted to distinguish Albritton by noting that in Albritton,
Boggs, the officer assigned to auto theft, "joined in a warranted search for narcotics for the sole
purpose of conducting an exploratory search for stolen vehicles; he engaged in no other search,
and stolen automobiles were found by him which, we held, should have been suppressed." Id.
However, in Williams, "Officers Hackney and Porter were specifically commanded to search
for and seize proscribed drugs; in the course of that search the officers observed in plain sight
items they suspected were stolen." Id. The court's attempt to reconcile the two cases is
ineffective for two reasons. First, the Williams court specifically held that subjective criteria,
such as an officer's state of mind, were irrelevant to Fourth Amendment issues. Id. at 920-21.
Therefore, Boggs' subjective motivations in Albritton are insufficient to distinguish that case
from Williams. Furthermore, Boggs testified that he had been "requested by the Vice Division
... to assist them in the search for narcotics." Albritton, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 653. Implicit in this
request was a directive that Boggs search for narcotics only. That he received no explicit
directive to that effect from the narcotics officers is an insufficient basis on which to distinguish
the two cases.
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home, they had probable cause to believe that the property was sto-
len,2 5 as required by Arizona v. Hicks.256 If the officers had not
expected to discover the stolen property in Williams' home, they
would have lacked the probable cause to believe that the property was
stolen, and they would not have been able to seize it under the plain
view doctrine. Therefore, in Williams, an affirmative showing that
the officers had found the stolen property inadvertently would have
been fatal to the state's use of the plain view doctrine rather than an
essential element of it. Having disposed of the inadvertence require-
ment, the court then turned to objective facts to evaluate whether the
officers had conducted a pretextual search for the stolen property.2
57
In Albritton, the court appreciated the fact that Boggs, an officer
assigned to the auto theft detail, had seized stolen property during a
search for narcotics.25  A bona fide search for illicit drugs does not
require the presence of an auto theft officer; therefore, Boggs' partici-
pation in the search constituted objective proof that he had used the
narcotics warrant and the plain view doctrine as a pretext to conduct
his own independent investigation into whether Albritton was dealing
in stolen vehicles. 259
In contrast, not only did the burglary officers in Williams assist
in the search for narcotics, the narcotics officer in charge of the inves-
tigation, Leavelle, testified, "Normally, if burglary is with us, [stolen
property] is what they are looking for. My mission is drugs; their
mission is stolen property. '"2" Thus, Leavelle admitted under oath
that as a matter of procedure, when burglary assisted narcotics in the
execution of a search warrant for narcotics, burglary's function was to
search for stolen property. This policy evidently approved pretextual
searches and allowed the burglary officers to circumvent the warrant
requirement when they wanted to search for stolen property but
lacked probable cause. Yet, moved by Leavelle's earlier comment
that "it was common for the narcotics detail to call in members of
other units to assist in serving search warrants,"' 261 the court dis-
255. Williams, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
256. 480 U.S. 321 (1987). In Hicks, a police officer arrived on the scene of a shooting and
discovered stereo equipment in plain view which he suspected was stolen. Id. at 323. He
moved the equipment so that he could read the serial numbers, and after verifying that it was
stolen, he seized it. Id. The Supreme Court held that the stereo could not be seized under the
plain view doctrine because the officer lacked probable cause to believe that the stereo was
stolen. Id. at 327-28.
257. Williams, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 920-21.
258. Albritton, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
259. Id. at 658.
260. Williams, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
261. Id. at 918.
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missed Leavelle's commentary on the diverse functions of the bur-
glary and narcotics officers as an assumption which lacked probative
value.262 Thus, because cooperation between the burglary and narcot-
ics departments was routine, the presence of the burglary officers was
not a reliable indication of pretext; the standardized collaboration
between the narcotics and burglary divisions created by the police
department's policy sterilized the policy itself.
In Albritton, the court also noted that Boggs, the auto theft
officer, had immediately proceeded to Albritton's garage to search for
stolen vehicles while the narcotics detectives searched the main house
for drugs.2 63 Although Boggs' contended that he was looking for nar-
cotics as well as stolen vehicles, 264 his conduct during the search was
strong objective evidence of a pretextual search.265
On the other hand, in Williams, the court accurately noted that
the burglary officers conducted themselves as though they were genu-
inely searching for narcotics. 266 Yet the court conveniently ignored
the suspicious calls between the narcotics and burglary officers that
occurred shortly before the search26 7-powerful objective evidence of
a conspiracy to overcome the burglary officers' lack of probable cause
to search for the stolen property. Indeed, this type of calculated, pre-
paratory planning is one of the most reliable manifestations of abuse
of the plain view doctrine. But once police policy standardizes the
sharing of information and personnel between police divisions, these
communications lose their incriminating character regardless of their
content and timing. All police interaction prior to a search is pre-
sumed innocent, and schemes to evade the warrant requirement, no
matter how blatant, become undetectable. By neglecting the officers'
preliminary collaboration, the Williams court implied that a defend-
ant could establish pretextual use of the plain view doctrine only if the
police acted improperly during the search itself. Therefore, whenever
officers wish to conduct a pretextual search and evade the warrant
requirement, they need merely give the appearance of propriety in the
execution of the facilitating warrant. Inequitable outcomes under this
262. Id. at 921.
263. Albritton, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
264. Id. at 654.
265. Id. at 657.
266. Williams, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
267. Id. at 916-17. In Williams, a burglary detective, after confessing that he lacked
probable cause to search Williams' residence for stolen property, admitted he had called the
narcotics division and told them that he suspected Williams of fencing stolen property. Id. at
916. Then, several days before the search, narcotics officers contacted the burglary division to
obtain information about Williams so that they could procure a search warrant for narcotics.
Id. at 917.
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rule are inevitable, and the inadvertence requirement for plain view
seizure, which would have resulted in the suppression of evidence in
both Albritton and Williams, emerges as indispensible to the fair
administration of justice.
Albritton, Miller, and Williams illustrate that standardized police
cooperation deprives courts of the most credible, objective indicators
of pretext. When burglary or auto theft officers routinely assist nar-
cotics officers in the execution of narcotics search warrants, the whole
operation appears constitutional. The burglary officers' participation
in a search for evidence unrelated to their primary law enforcement
responsibilities is not considered unusual, much less sinister. Further-
more, because police departments habitually exchange information
about a single suspect's unrelated criminal activity, dubious interac-
tion between police divisions before a search, another objective indica-
tion of pretext, can always be rationalized as a bona fide attempt to
coordinate personnel and improve law enforcement efficiency. Insti-
tutionalized cooperation between police departments thus skews the
court's investigation into the objective facts surrounding the search.
Even the most egregious police conduct can be excused as a "reason-
able" officer's attempt to augment his resources so that he can fight
crime more effectively, and our Fourth Amendment rights are com-
promised in the calculus.
VII. CONCLUSION: DEFINING THE INADVERTENCE
REQUIREMENT TO RECONCILE PRIVACY RIGHTS AND
CRIME CONTROL
Even if contemporary law enforcement cooperation and the new
pretextual search doctrine make the inadvertence requirement essen-
tial to the equitable administration of justice, any new inadvertence
rule must be carefully formulated to avoid unintended consequences.
The objective should be to define the inadvertence requirement to pre-
serve a suspect's right to privacy, minimize unchecked police discre-
tion, and permit legitimate law enforcement efforts. The inadvertence
requirement should permit seizures of evidence in plain view when
that evidence has been innocently omitted from either a warrant or
affidavit. But the inadvertent discovery rule should prohibit seizures
of evidence in plain view where the police have made a calculated
attempt to evade the warrant requirement.
Because subjective, testimonial proof of an officer's state of mind
lends itself to self-serving statements, achieving the delicate balance
between crime control and privacy rights requires reliance on objec-
tive, non-testimonial evidence, such as written reports and the officer's
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conduct before and during the search. However, there must be one
exception: where an officer makes a statement against interest by tes-
tifying that he deliberately acted on a pretext to evade the warrant
requirement," 8 the admission should be conclusive proof that a
seizure was unconstitutional. This type of statement, because it is
inherently credible, should not be excluded from an investigation into
alleged pretextual behavior.
When police have a warrant to search a suspect's home, the evi-
dence that they seize under the plain view doctrine falls into two cate-
gories. First, during their search, police may discover evidence in
plain view directly related to the crime targeted by the warrant.269
Second, police often seize evidence in plain view unrelated to the spe-
cific crime for which the warrant was issued.270 When police discover
evidence in plain view related to the precise crime targeted by the
search warrant, it is unlikely that they have used the warrant or the
plain view doctrine as a pretext to circumvent the Fourth Amend-
ment. The police may have carelessly omitted the evidence from their
search warrant request even though they had probable cause to search
268. See United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1514 (10th Cir. 1988) (officer admitted
under oath that he stopped the defendant's car to investigate whether he was transporting
contraband, not for a seat belt violation); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1180 (5th
Cir. 1987) (officer testified that the only reason he arrested the defendant on an outstanding
petty theft warrant was so that he could interrogate him about a bank robbery); United States
v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 706 (11 th Cir. 1986) (officer testified that he stopped the defendants'
car to search it for contraband and not because it "weaved").
269. Horton v. California typifies this type of seizure. Recall that in Horton, police
investigating a robbery seized weapons that they had expected to find in Horton's home, but
the warrant only authorized them to seize the proceeds from the robbery. Horton v.
California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2304 (1990); see also State v. Hamilton, 573 A.2d 1197 (Conn.
1990) (holding that a set of van keys which had not been included in a warrant authorizing a
search for narcotics could not be seized under the plain view doctrine because its discovery had
not been inadvertent); Hewell v. State, 471 N.E.2d 1235 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
silver items not described with particularity in a warrant could not be seized under the plain
view doctrine because they had not been discovered inadvertently); State v. White, 361 S.E.2d
301 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that stolen property which had been omitted from a
warrant authorizing a search for other stolen property had not been inadvertently found and
could not be seized under the plain view doctrine); Fritz v. State, 730 P.2d 530 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1986) (holding that credit cards which had not been included in a warrant that
authorized a search for other proceeds from the robbery could not be seized under the plain
view doctrine because they had not been inadvertently found); State v. Albright, 418 N.W.2d
292 (S.D. 1988) (holding that stolen property which had been omitted from a warrant
authorizing a search for other stolen property could not be seized under the plain view
doctrine).
270. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 243 Cal. Rptr. 914, 915 (Ct. App. 1988) (stolen property
seized in plain view during a search for narcotics); People v. Miller, 242 Cal. Rptr. 179, 180
(Ct. App. 1987) (narcotics seized during a search for evidence of counterfeiting); People v.
Albritton, 187 Cal. Rptr. 652, 653 (Ct. App. 1982) (stolen vehicles seized during a search for
narcotics); Lockhart v. State, 305 S.E.2d 22 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (marijuana seized during a
search for untaxed whiskey).
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for it.27" ' Or the police may have included the item in their affida-
vits,272 but the magistrate may have inadvertently omitted the item
from the warrant. In such cases, the police have made a good faith
attempt to adhere to the warrant process. Seizures of this type of
evidence ought to raise a rebuttable presumption that police con-
ducted a constitutional search, and the inadvertence discovery
requirement should not bar admission of the evidence. If the police
can present a copy of a police affidavit, submitted as part of a search
warrant application, which includes the evidence seized in plain
27view,  then the affidavit is dispositive objective proof that the police
followed the warrant process and did not use plain view as a pretext.
In such a case, the presumption that the police lawfully seized the
evidence should be conclusory as a matter of law.
However, if the police officer's affidavit omitted the item seized in
plain view,274 then the court should permit the defendant to use that
affidavit as objective, prima facie evidence that the police lacked prob-
able cause to search for that item and intentionally used the plain
view doctrine as a pretext to circumvent the warrant requirement.
The police, in turn, could meet this contention by producing objective
evidence, such as police reports27 5 or written transcripts from conver-
sations with informants,2 76 indicating that they had probable cause to
search for the item, but accidently omitted the item from their affida-
vit. If police successfully produce such objective evidence, then the
search should be constitutional. This new rule applied to Horton and
Coolidge, would admit the evidence seized in both cases, because the
evidence seized in plain view linked the suspects to the crime targeted
by the warrant, and the police included the evidence seized in plain
view in their applications for search warrants.277
271. See, e.g., Hamilton, 573 A.2d at 1197; Hewell, 471 N.E.2d 1235 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984);
White, 361 S.E.2d at 301; Fritz, 730 P.2d at 530; Albright, 418 N.W.2d at 292.
272. See Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2304; Albright, 418 N.W.2d at 294.
273. See Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2304; Albright, 418 N.W.2d at 294.
274. Hamilton, 573 A.2d at 1205-06 (narcotics suppressed because keys used to open van in
which narcotics were stored had been omitted from the investigating officers' warrant request);
Hewell, 471 N.E.2d at 1235 (stolen property suppressed because it had not been included in the
police officer's affidavit, which requested a search for other stolen property); White, 361 S.E.2d
at 301 (stolen property suppressed where police had omitted those items from their search
warrant request); Fritz, 730 P.2d at 530 (credit cards suppressed because they were omitted
from an officer's request to search for stolen property).
275. White, 361 S.E.2d at 307 (stolen property was included in police reports but omitted
from an affidavit due to police oversight).
276. Hamilton, 573 A.2d at 1205-06 (informant stated that the defendant had used his van
keys to open a van in which narcotics was stored).
277. E.g., Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2304; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 446
(1971).
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On the other hand, when one police agency, department, or divi-
sion assists another in executing a single search warrant, and the
assisting officer seizes evidence in plain view which falls within the
sphere of his law enforcement responsibilities but is unrelated to the
crime targeted by the warrant,278 there should be a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the assisting agency, department, or division used the
warrant and the plain view doctrine as a pretext to evade the warrant
requirement. In this case, the burden should fall upon the agency that
discovered the unrelated evidence to prove that it was not engaged in
an independent investigation of the suspect. This proof should also be
non-testimonial, objective evidence, such as the absence of the sus-
pects' name on the agency's master computer files. Despite its objec-
tive nature, evidence of police policy authorizing interagency
cooperation in the execution of search warrants is irrelevant because
it can often be the means by which the agencies coordinate their
efforts to avoid the judicial process mandated by the Fourth Amend-
ment. Thus, unless the agency tenders valid, objective evidence of
good faith, application of the inadvertence requirement should result
in suppression of the seized evidence.
If the assisting agency can prove that it was not conducting its
own independent investigation of a suspect, then a police policy that
standardizes cooperation between the departments should be objective
proof that the assisting agency acted in good faith. This presumption
should be a rebuttable one, overcome if the defendant presents objec-
tive evidence, such as police reports or transcripts of informants' con-
versations, that the assisting agency independently investigated the
suspect for unrelated crimes.
Although the inadvertence requirement is necessary to deter
police discretion, its formulation in Coolidge v. New Hampshire79 was
inflexible and overreaching. Even though the officers in Coolidge had
not attempted to evade the warrant requirement, 2 0 the Court held
that the police could not seize Coolidge's car under the plain view
doctrine.28 ' By focusing on police discretion, Coolidge addressed an
issue that its facts did not present. It failed to accomodate cases such
278. E.g., People v. Williams, 243 Cal. Rptr. 914, 915 (Ct. App. 1988) (burglary detectives
seized stolen property during a search for narcotics); People v. Miller, 242 Cal. Rptr. 179, 180
(Ct. App. 1987) (city narcotics officers seize narcotics during a search for evidence of
counterfeiting); People v. Albritton, 187 Cal. Rptr. 652, 653 (Ct. App. 1982) (officer assigned
to auto theft detail seizes stolen vehicles during a search for narcotics).
279. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
280. Id. at 447. Although the police in Coolidge obtained a warrant to search Coolidge's
car, the warrant was later declared invalid because it had been issued by the attorney general in
charge of the investigation, not by a neutral and detached magistrate. Id. at 450-53.
281. Id. at 464.
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as Horton v. California, where police genuinely attempted to adhere to
the warrant process, but human carelessness caused the process to
break down.2" 2 The model proposed by this Comment would remedy
this deficiency by reformulating the inadvertence requirement. In its
modified form, the inadvertence requirement would bar the admission
of evidence when police use the plain view doctrine as a pretext to
exercise their own discretion, but would admit evidence when the
warrant process fails because of innocent human oversight. It permits
police to pool their resources to fight crime but prohibits them from
circumventing the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Such
a modified inadvertence requirement strikes the delicate balance
between crime control and privacy rights.
LOREN KEITH NEWMAN
282. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2304 (1990). Although the police in Horton
requested permission to search for both the weapons and proceeds from the robbery in their
affidavit for a search warrant, the magistrate only authorized them to search for the proceeds.
Id. at 2304. In concluding that the police had probable cause to seize the weapons, which they
discovered in plain view, the Court implied that the weapons had been omitted from the
warrant due to an oversight of the magistrate. Id. at 2310-11.
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